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1 Introduction
Preferences are assumed to be interdependent for informational or psychological reasons in many areas of
economics. But there has been little attempt to identify what are the observable implications of such prefer-
ences. A classic and well developed ￿revealed preference￿theory underlies economists￿way of understanding
individual choice. An analogous strategic revealed preference understanding of interdependent preferences is
required. This paper proposes an approach to this question.
Fix an interdependent preferences environment, with a ￿nite set of agents, each with a ￿nite set of possible
payo⁄ types, with expected utility preferences over lotteries depending on the whole pro￿le of types. Say
that two payo⁄types of an agent are strategically distinguishable if they have disjoint rationalizable strategic
choices in some ￿nite game for all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs about others￿types. Thus a pair
of payo⁄ types are strategically indistinguishable if in every game, there exists some action which each type
might rationally choose given some beliefs and higher order beliefs. We are able to provide an exact and
insightful characterization of strategic distinguishability. If we have sets of types, ￿1 and ￿2, of agents 1
and 2, respectively, we say that ￿2 separates ￿1 if knowing agent 1￿ s preferences and knowing that agent 1
is sure that agent 2￿ s type is in ￿2, we can rule out at least one type of agent 1. Now consider an iterative
process where we start, for each agent, with all subsets of his type set and - at each round - delete subsets
of actions that are separated by every remaining subset of types of his opponents. A pair of types are said
to be pairwise inseparable if the set consisting of that pair of types survives this process. We show that two
types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they are pairwise inseparable.
If there are private values and every type is value distinguished, then every pair of types will be pairwise
separable and thus strategically distinguishable. Thus strategic indistinguishability arises when the degree
of interdependence in preferences is large. We can illustrate this with a simple example. Suppose that
agent i￿ s payo⁄ type is ￿i 2 [0;1] and agent i￿ s valuation of a private good is ￿i + ￿
X
j6=i
￿j. Each agent has
quasilinear utility, i.e., his utility from money is linear and additive. We show all distinct pairs of types are
strategically distinguishable if j￿j < 1
I￿1 where I is the number of agents. All pairs of types are strategically
indistinguishable if j￿j ￿ 1
I￿1.
Two rational payo⁄ types are strategically indistinguishable if they might choose the same action (in
any game). We will show that this strategic revealed preference relation on payo⁄ types is key to the
implementation problem, when one cannot allow for the possibility of two distinct types behaving the same
in every mechanism. But say that two payo⁄ types are strategically equivalent if the sets of actions they
might choose are the same (in any game). In other words, two types are strategically equivalent if they
have the same set of rationalizable actions in every game. We contrast strategic distinguishability with
strategic equivalence and note that strategic equivalence generates a much ￿ner partition on agents￿types;
for example, in the linear example of the previous paragraph, no distinct types are strategically equivalent.
If two rational payo⁄ types are strategically equivalent, it is not possible that they will behave di⁄erently in
any game. Strategic equivalence is the relevant strategic revealed preference notion if one is interested in
identifying the ￿nest behaviorally relevant description of agents￿interdependent types. This is the question
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of interdependent preferences. While they do not explicitly allow for uncertainty or incorporate strategic
choices, the strategic equivalence question in our framework is closely related to their exercise. In particular,
to facilitate the comparison, we show that a version of their validity condition is su¢ cient to ensure that
distinct types are not strategically equivalent.
As well as its intrinsic interest, strategic distinguishability is key in characterizing when robust virtual
implementation is possible. Suppose that a social planner would like to design a mechanism that will induce
self-interested agents to make strategic choices that will lead to the selection of socially desirable outcomes.
A social choice function speci￿es the social desired outcomes as a function of unobserved payo⁄ types of the
agents. The planner would like to be sure that outcomes speci￿ed by the social choice function arise with
probability arbitrarily close to 1: thus she requires virtual implementation; she would like every possible
equilibrium to virtually implement the social choice function: thus she requires full implementation; and she
would like every equilibrium to virtually implement the social choice function whatever the agents￿beliefs
and higher order beliefs about others￿types; thus she requires robust implementation. In this paper, we
provide a characterization of when robust virtual implementation is possible in a general interdependent
preference environment.
One necessary condition for robust virtual implementation will be ex post incentive compatibility: under
the social choice function, each agent must have an incentive to truthfully report his type if others￿report
their types truthfully, whatever their types. Ex post incentive compatibility is su¢ cient to ensure the
existence of desirable equilibria, but, as the existing incomplete information implementation literature has
emphasized, further restrictions on the social choice function are required to rule out other, undesirable,
equilibria. If a mechanism is to fully implement a social choice function, it must be that two types who are
treated di⁄erently by the social choice function are guaranteed to behave di⁄erently in the implementing
mechanism. If two types are guaranteed to behave di⁄erently in the implementing mechanism, then - under
our de￿nition outlined above - they are strategically distinguishable. Thus a second necessary condition for
robust virtual implementation will be robust measurability: strategically indistinguishable types are treated
the same by the social choice function. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability
are also su¢ cient for robust virtual implementation (under an economic assumption).
Our characterization result for strategic distinguishability (theorem 1) comes in two parts. If two types
of an agent are pairwise inseparable, then they belong to a set of types which are not separable by a pro￿le of
sets of types of that agent￿ s opponents. The set of types of each opponent in that pro￿le is then not separable
by a pro￿le of sets of types of that opponent￿ s opponents. And there is a continuing chain of inseparable sets
in the chain. We prove that pairwise inseparable types are strategically indistinguishable (proposition 1) by
induction, showing that in any mechanism at any round in the iterated deletion of messages that are never
best responses and for every set of types in the chain of inseparable type sets, there is a common action
which is played. The inseparability property ensures that we can always construct beliefs for each type that
make the same message a best response.
To show the converse result (proposition 2), we construct a single, ￿nite maximally revealing mechanism
with the property that all pairwise separable types have disjoint sets of rationalizable actions. The con-
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of one agent is separated by a pro￿le of sets of types of other agents, we are able to construct a ￿nite set of
lotteries such that knowing the ￿rst agent￿ s preference over those lotteries will always rule out at least one of
his types. We can take the union over all such ￿nite sets constructed for each pro￿le of type sets where the
separability property holds. We then construct a ￿nite ￿test set￿of lotteries such that knowing an agent￿ s
most preferred outcome in that test set implicitly reveals his ranking of outcomes in all the original sets.
Finally, we consider a mechanism where each agent gets to pick a lottery with some positive probability,
then guesses which lotteries others chose and gets to pick another lottery, with small probability, contingent
on other agents making the choice he conjectured, and so on. With a large, but ￿nite, number of rounds
this mechanism will eventually lead pairwise separable types to make distinct choices.
Our proof of the su¢ ciency of ex post incentive compatibility and robust measurability (corollary 1) for
robust virtual implementation builds on an ingenious construction used by Abreu and Matsushima (1992b)
to establish an extremely permissive result for complete information virtual implementation; in Abreu and
Matsushima (1992c), they adapted the argument to a standard Bayesian virtual implementation problem;
we in turn adapt the argument to our robust virtual implementation problem.
While our su¢ ciency argument for robust virtual implementation builds on Abreu and Matsushima
(1992c), the interpretation of our results ends up being rather di⁄erent. Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)
characterized virtual implementation in a standard Bayesian environment, where there was common knowl-
edge of a common prior over a ￿xed set of types, using the solution concept of iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies and restricting attention to well-behaved (￿nite) mechanisms. Bayesian incentive com-
patibility of the social choice function is a necessary condition: a standard compactness argument shows
that the weakening to virtual implementation does not weaken the incentive compatibility requirement. In
addition, they showed that a measurability condition was necessary. Put each agent￿ s types into equiva-
lence classes that have the same preferences over outcomes - unconditional on other agents￿types. Having
distinguished some types by their unconditional preferences, we can then further re￿ne agents￿types, by
distinguishing types with di⁄erent preferences conditional on other agents￿types in the ￿rst round. We
can continue this process of re￿ning agents￿types based on preferences conditional on other agents￿types
revealed so far. The social choice function is Abreu-Matsushima measurable if it is measurable with respect
to the limit of this iterative re￿nement. This seems to be a weak restriction that is generically satis￿ed.1
They show that Bayesian incentive compatibility and Abreu-Matsushima measurability are su¢ cient as well
as necessary for virtual implementation in iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Robust virtual implementation is equivalent to requiring that there is a single mechanism that implements
a social choice function, for all possible type spaces that could be constructed for the environment with
￿xed payo⁄ types and utility functions for the agents. It is instructive to see how to get from Abreu and
Matsushima (1992c) to the robust virtual implementation application in this paper.
Observe that Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)￿ s solution concept naturally uses agents￿given beliefs about
others￿types in their solution concept: when strategies are deleted, it is because they are strictly dominated
1Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) and Serrano and Vohra (2005) note that a simple su¢ cient condition for all social choice
functions to be A-M measurable is type diversity: every type has distinct preferences over lotteries unconditional on others￿
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conditional on their beliefs. We want implementation for all possible beliefs; we therefore establish our
results under an incomplete information version of rationalizability that does not make use of any beliefs
over others￿types; it is equivalent to iteratively deleting strategies that are ex post strictly dominated, i.e.,
strictly dominated for all possible beliefs over others￿types. We work with this solution concept throughout
the paper. However, results from the epistemic foundations of game theory establish that an action is
rationalizable in this sense for a payo⁄ type if and only if it could be played in an equilibrium on some type
space with beliefs and higher order beliefs, by a type with that payo⁄type (Brandenburger and Dekel (1987)
and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)). Thus a bonus of our ￿robust￿analysis is that the distinction between
equilibrium and rationalizability (or iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies) becomes moot.
Now ex post incentive compatibility is the robust analogue of Bayesian incentive compatibility and
robust measurability is the robust analogue of Abreu-Matsushima measurability. Abreu and Matsushima
(1992c) could reasonably argue that - in a standard Bayesian setting - their measurability condition is a
weak technical requirement.2 As a result, the ￿bottom line￿of the virtual implementation literature has
been that full implementation, i.e., getting rid of undesirable equilibria, does not impose any substantive
constraints beyond incentive compatibility, i.e., the existence of desirable equilibria. By requiring the more
demanding, but more plausible, robust formulation of incomplete information, we end up with a condition
that is substantive, imposing signi￿cantly more structure in interdependent value environments than incentive
compatibility, easily interpretable and - via the relation to strategic distinguishability - of independent
conceptual interest.
This paper adds to a recent literature on robust mechanism design that provides one operationalization
of the so-called ￿Wilson doctrine￿ 3 that progress in practical mechanism design will come from relaxing the
implicit common knowledge assumption in the formulation of mechanism design problems.4 Neeman (2004)
highlighted the fact that full surplus extraction with correlated type results (Myerson (1981) and Cremer
and McLean (1985)) rely on the implicit assumption that there is common knowledge of a mapping from
beliefs to payo⁄ types of all agents (a ￿beliefs determine preferences￿ property). This (counterintuitive)
assumption is implied by the ￿generic￿choice of a common prior on a ￿xed type space where distinct types
are assumed to have di⁄erent preferences. The apparent weakness of the Abreu-Matsushima measurability
condition (and the fact that it is satis￿ed for generic priors) relies on the same property. We believe that by
relaxing this unnatural implicit assumption, we get a better insight into the nature of the extra requirement
for full implementation over and above incentive compatibility conditions.
It is possible to interpret our result as rather negative: ex post incentive compatibility is already a very
strong condition, as emphasized by the recent work of Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006);
robust measurability adds the further substantive restriction that there not be too much interdependence
of preferences; and, in any case, the mechanism that we use to robustly virtually implement social choice
functions is complicated to describe and presumably hard to play. However, we can show that in one large and
interesting class of economic environments with interdependent preferences, robust virtual implementation
2Although Serrano and Vohra (2001) describe an economic example where all individually rational and Bayesian incentive
compatible social choice functions fail Abreu-Matsushima measurability because types have identical conditional preferences.
3Wilson (1987) contains a statement of what Eric Maskin has dubbed the ￿Wilson doctrine￿.
4Neeman (2004), Bergemann and Morris (2005c), Heifetz and Neeman (2006), Chung and Ely (2007).Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 6
is not only possible but is possible in the direct mechanism where agents simply report their payo⁄ types.
Say that an environment has aggregator single crossing preferences if the pro￿le of agents￿types can be
aggregated into a single number and preferences are single crossing with respect to that number. E¢ cient
social choice functions satisfying ex post incentive compatibility often exist in such environments. Bergemann
and Morris (2005a) showed that in such an environment, exact robust implementation is possible if the social
choice function satis￿es strict ex post incentive compatibility and a contraction property. In this paper, we
observe that the contraction property is equivalent to robust measurability, so that - under the weak condition
that there exists some strictly ex post incentive compatible social choice function - whenever robust virtual
implementation is possible, it is possible in the direct mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the environment and the
solution concept. Section 3 illustrates the notion of separability in the context of a single private good with
interdependent preferences. Section 4 de￿nes and characterizes strategic distinguishability, constructing the
maximally revealing mechanism to show the equivalence between strategic distinguishability to pairwise
separability. Section 5 reports our results on robust virtual implementation. Section 6 contains discussion
of the stronger notion strategic equivalence (discussed above), the epistemic foundations for the solution
concept, weak rather than strict dominance, postive results in the direct mechanisms and the relation to
exact implementation results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Setting
2.1 Environment
There is a ￿nite set of agents 1;:::;I and each agent i has ￿nite set of possible payo⁄ types:
￿i =
n
￿
1
i;:::;￿
l
i;:::;￿
L
i
o
.
We assume without loss of generality that the cardinality of each set ￿i is equal to L for all i. The ￿nite set
X of pure outcomes is given by
X = fx1;:::;xn;:::;xNg:
The lottery space over the set of outcome is Y = ￿(X). A lottery y is an N dimensional vector
y = (y1;:::;yn;:::;yN) with
yn ￿ 0;
N X
n=1
yn = 1:
Each agent has a von Neumann Morgenstern expected utility function ui : Y ￿ ￿ ! R with
ui (y;￿) =
N X
n=1
ui (xn;￿)yn:
We will abuse notation by writing x for the lottery putting probability 1 on outcome x and X for the set of
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It is often convenient to work with underlying preferences over lotteries rather than any of their represen-
tations. We write R for the collection of expected utility preference relations on Y . We will write R￿i;￿i 2 R
for the preference relation of agent i if his payo⁄ type is ￿i and he has belief ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i) about the types
of others:
8y;y0 2 Y : yR￿i;￿iy0 ,
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y0;(￿i;￿￿i));
and we write P￿i;￿i for the strict preference relation corresponding to R￿i;￿i.
We make a non-degeneracy assumption on preferences: every agent i, whatever his type ￿i 2 ￿i and
beliefs ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), has a strict preference over some pair of outcomes:
Assumption 1 (Non-Degeneracy)
For each i, ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), there exist x;x0 2 X such that xP￿i;￿ix0.
We maintain this assumption throughout the paper.5 We denote by y the central lottery which puts
equal probability on each of the pure outcomes. Now non-degeneracy implies that every agent i, whatever
his type ￿i and beliefs ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), strictly prefers some pure outcome x to y; and compactness implies
that those strict preferences are uniformly strict:
Lemma 1 There exists c > 0 such that, for each i, ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), there exists x 2 X such that
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) >
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) + c.
The lemma is proved in appendix 8.1 and we will use c in our later constructions. We will also exploit
the existence of an upper bound on payo⁄ di⁄erences C which follows immediately from the ￿niteness of
pure outcomes and states:
Lemma 2 There exists C > 0 such that
jui (y;￿) ￿ ui (y0;￿)j ￿ C;
for all i;y;y0;￿.
2.2 Mechanisms and Solution Concept
A mechanism M is a collection ((Mi)
I
i=1 ;g) where each Mi is ￿nite and g : M ! Y . We denote a belief of
agent i over the product of payo⁄ type and message spaces of the other agents by ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i). We
consider the process of iteratively eliminating never best responses, without making assumptions on agents￿
beliefs about others￿payo⁄ types.
The set of messages surviving the k￿th level of elimination for type ￿i in mechanism M are iteratively
de￿ned by
S
M;0
i (￿i) = Mi
5Our results can be extended to allow for non-degeneracy, see appendix 8.6 for details.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 8
and, for each k = 0;1;::
S
M;k+1
i (￿i) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
mi 2 S
M;k
i (￿i)
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
9 ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i) s.t.:
(1) ￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) m￿i 2 S
M;k
￿i (￿￿i)
(2) mi 2 argmax
m0
i
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (m0
i;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i))
9
> > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > ;
;
we let
SM
i (￿i) =
\
k￿0
S
M;k
i (￿i).
We refer to SM
i (￿i) as the rationalizable messages of type ￿i of agent i in mechanism M. This incomplete
information version of rationalizability was studied in Battigalli (1998) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003).
A standard and well known duality argument implies that this solution concept is equivalent to iterated
deletion of ex post strictly dominated strategies.
SM
i (￿i) is the set of messages that type ￿i might send consistent with knowing that his payo⁄ type is ￿i,
common knowledge of rationality and the set of possible payo⁄types of the other players, but no restrictions
on his beliefs and higher order beliefs about other types. Equivalently, it is the set of messages that might be
played in any equilibrium on any type space by a type of player i with payo⁄type ￿i and any possible beliefs
and higher order beliefs about others￿payo⁄ types. In section 6.2, we report a formal argument con￿rming
this interpretation. In the body of the paper, we work directly with this solution concept.
2.3 Separability
We will be interested in the set of preferences that an agent might have if his payo⁄ type is ￿i and he knows
that the type ￿j of each opponent j belongs to some subset ￿j of his possible types ￿j. Thus writing
￿￿i = f￿jgj6=i for a pro￿le of subsets of i￿ s opponents, we de￿ne
Ri (￿i;￿￿i) = fR 2 RjR = R￿i;￿i for some ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i)g.
Now suppose we observed i￿ s preferences over lotteries and knew that i assigned probability 1 to his oppo-
nents￿type pro￿le ￿￿i being an element of ￿￿i, what would we be able to deduce about i￿ s type? We will
say that ￿￿i separates ￿i if - whatever those realized preferences - we could rule out at least one possible
type of i.
De￿nition 1 (Separation)
Type set pro￿le ￿￿i separates ￿i if
\
￿i2￿i
Ri (￿i;￿￿i) = ?.
We will be interested in a process by which we iteratively delete type sets of each agent that are separated
by some type set pro￿le of his opponents. Thus writing ￿k
i for the kth level inseparable sets of player i, we
have:
￿0
i = 2￿i, (1)Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 9
and
￿
k+1
i =
￿
￿i 2 ￿k
i j ￿￿i does not separate ￿i, for some ￿￿i 2 ￿k
￿i
￿
; (2)
and a (￿nite) limit type set pro￿le is de￿ned by:
￿￿
i =
\
k￿0
￿k
i . (3)
Finally, we say that a pair of types are pairwise inseparable if they cannot be iteratively separated in
this way:
De￿nition 2 (Pairwise Inseparability)
Types ￿i and ￿
0
i are pairwise inseparable (written ￿i ￿ ￿
0
i) if
￿
￿i;￿
0
i
￿
2 ￿￿
i.
Note that the relation ￿ is re￿ exive and symmetric by construction, but it is not necessarily transitive.
The following ￿￿xed point￿ characterization of pairwise inseparability will be useful in the analysis that
follows. Let ￿ = (￿i)
I
i=1 2 ￿I
i=12￿i be a pro￿le of type sets for each agent.
De￿nition 3 (Mutual Inseparability)
￿ is mutually inseparable if, for each i and ￿i 2 ￿i, there exists ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i such that ￿￿i does not separate
￿i.
Lemma 3 Types ￿i and ￿
0
i are pairwise inseparable if and only if there exists mutually inseparable ￿ =
(￿i)
I
i=1 and ￿i 2 ￿i with
￿
￿i;￿
0
i
￿
￿ ￿i.
if. Suppose there exists b ￿ =
￿
b ￿i
￿I
i=1
and ￿i 2 b ￿i with
￿
￿i;￿
0
i
￿
￿ ￿i. We claim that
n
￿i
￿
￿
￿￿i ￿ ￿0
i and ￿0
i 2 b ￿i for some ￿0
i
o
￿ ￿k
i
for each k = 0;1;::: . The claim holds for k = 0 by de￿nition. Suppose the claim holds for arbitrary k and
suppose that ￿i ￿ ￿0
i and ￿0
i 2 b ￿i. Because b ￿ is mutually inseparable, there exists ￿￿i 2 b ￿￿i ￿ ￿k
i such
that ￿￿i does not separate ￿0
i. By the de￿nition of separation, since ￿i ￿ ￿0
i, ￿￿i does not separate ￿i.
So ￿i 2 ￿
k+1
i and
￿
￿i;￿
0
i
￿
￿ ￿i 2 ￿￿
i =
\
k￿0
￿k
i :
[only if] Observe that ￿
k+1
i ￿ ￿k
i for each k = 0;1;::: by construction. Thus (￿￿
i)
I
i=1 is mutually
inseparable. Thus if ￿i ￿ ￿
0
i, there exists mutually inseparable ￿￿ with
￿
￿i;￿
0
i
￿
2 ￿￿
i.
3 An Environment with Interdependent Values for a Single Good
We consider a quasi-linear environment with a single good with interdependent values to illustrate the notion
of separability. There are I agents and agent i￿ s payo⁄ type is ￿i 2 [0;1]. If the type pro￿le is ￿, agent i￿ s
valuation of an object is given by:
vi (￿i;￿￿i) = ￿i + ￿
X
j6=i
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with ￿ 2 R+. The parameter ￿ measures the amount of interdependence in valuations: the case of private
values is given by ￿ = 0 and the case of pure common values is ￿ = 1. The net utility of agent i depends on
his probability yi of receiving the object and the monetary transfer ti:
ui (￿;yi;ti) =
0
@￿i + ￿
X
j6=i
￿j
1
Ayi ￿ ti.
We determine the conditions for separability of types in this preference environment.6
Type set pro￿le ￿￿i separates ￿i if, knowing i￿ s preferences and knowing that he is sure that others￿type
pro￿le is ￿￿i, we can always rule out some ￿i. In this example, because the utility function ui (￿) is linear
in the monetary transfer for all types and all agents, separability must come from di⁄erent valuations of the
object. For given type set pro￿le ￿￿i of all but i, we can identify the set of possible (expected) valuations
of agent i with type ￿i by writing:
Vi (￿i;￿￿i) =
8
<
:
vi 2 R+
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿
9￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i) s.t. vi = ￿i + ￿
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)
X
j6=i
￿j
9
=
;
=
2
4￿i + ￿
X
j6=i
min￿j; ￿i + ￿
X
j6=i
max￿j
3
5. (4)
Now ￿￿i separates ￿i if and only if
\
￿i2￿i
Vi (￿i;￿￿i) = ?.
This is equivalent to requiring that
Vi (max￿i;￿￿i) \ Vi (min￿i;￿￿i) = ?.
By (4), this will hold if and only if
max￿i + ￿
X
j6=i
min￿j > min￿i + ￿
X
j6=i
max￿j.
We can rewrite the inequality as
max￿i ￿ min￿i > ￿
X
j6=i
(max￿j ￿ min￿j).
Thus ￿￿i separates ￿i if and only if the di⁄erence between the smallest and the largest element in the set
￿i is larger than the weighted sum of the di⁄erences of the smallest and the largest element in the remaining
sets ￿j for all j 6= i. Conversely, ￿￿i does not separate ￿i if the above inequality is reversed, i.e.,
max￿i ￿ min￿i ￿ ￿
X
j6=i
(max￿j ￿ min￿j). (5)
6The example has a continuum of types and a continuum of deterministic monetary allocations. In contrast, the general
model is de￿ned for a ￿nite number of types and pure outcomes. We could rewrite the example and the corresponding results
without loss in the ￿nite setting. With a ￿nite model, integer problems would need to be taken into account in deriving the
inequalities to make sure that the process of elimination proceeds. In particular, the exact value of the critical threshold for
interdependence, to be determined below, would depend on the size of the grid. Naturally, as the grid becomes ￿ner, the critical
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Now we can identify the kth level inseparable sets, described in (1)-(3), for our example. We have
￿0
i = 2[0;1]
and, by (5),
￿
k+1
i =
8
<
:
￿i 2 ￿k
i
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
max￿i ￿ min￿i ￿ ￿
X
j6=i
max
￿j2￿k
j
(max￿j ￿ min￿j)
9
=
;
;
Now by induction, we have that
￿
k+1
i =
n
￿i
￿
￿ ￿max￿i ￿ min￿i ￿ (￿ (I ￿ 1))
k
o
:
Thus if ￿ (I ￿ 1) < 1, ￿￿
i consists of singletons, ￿￿
i = (f￿ig)￿i2[0;1], while if ￿ (I ￿ 1) ￿ 1, ￿￿
i consists of all
subsets, ￿￿
i = 2[0;1].
Thus if ￿ < 1
I￿1, so that interdependence is not too large, every distinct pair of types are pairwise
separable. If ￿ ￿ 1
I￿1, every pair of types are pairwise inseparable. We note that the linear structure of the
valuations vi (￿) leads to the strong converse result. But the example illustrates the general principle that
pairwise separability corresponds to not too much interdependence.7
Our later results will show that if ￿ ￿ 1
I￿1, no social choice function (except for a constant one) is robustly
virtually implementable; but if ￿ < 1
I￿1, any ex post incentive compatible allocation can be robustly virtually
implemented. One can construct generalized VCG payments such that e¢ cient allocation is ex post incentive
compatible in this environment if ￿ ￿ 1 (Cremer and McLean (1988), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000)). Thus
the e¢ cient allocation is robustly virtually implementable if and only if ￿ < 1
I￿1. We return to this example,
after describing our results for general environments, in section 6.4.8
4 Strategic Distinguishability
4.1 De￿nition
Two payo⁄types are strategically distinguishable if there exists a mechanism where the rationalizable actions
of those payo⁄ types are disjoint; thus they are strategically indistinguishable if they have a rationalizable
action in common in every mechanism.
De￿nition 4 (Strategically Indistinguishable)
Types ￿i and ￿
0
i are strategically indistinguishable if SM (￿i) \ SM ￿
￿
0
i
￿
6= ? for every M.
We have two reasons for being interested in characterizing strategic distinguishability.
7This observation can be straightforwardly extended to ￿ < 0, i.e., negative interdependence in preferences; now if j￿j < 1
I￿1,
all distinct pairs of types are pairwise separable; if j￿j ￿ 1
I￿1, all pairs of types are pairwise inseparable.
8In fact, robust virtual implementation is possible in the direct mechanism. Chung and Ely (2001) ￿rst identi￿ed this
condition as su¢ cient for (exact) implementation of the e¢ cient outcome in iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
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First, assumptions of interdependence of preferences for informational or psychological reasons are preva-
lent in many areas of economics, but there has been little attempt to identify what are the observable
implications of such preferences. A classic and well developed ￿revealed preference￿theory underlies econo-
mists￿ way of understanding individual choice. An analogous strategic revealed preference approach to
understanding interdependent preferences is required. We believe that our characterization of ￿strategic
distinguishability￿ delivers some clean insights about strategic revealed preferences and may be a useful
component of a more general approach to the question.
Second, our characterization of strategic distinguishability turns out to be the key step in our character-
ization of robust virtual implementation, described in the next section.
We say that two types are strategically indistinguishable if they do not have any rationalizable messages
in common. A more demanding relation between types would be to require that they have the same
rationalizable actions: thus types ￿i and ￿
0
i are strategically equivalent if SM (￿i) = SM ￿
￿
0
i
￿
for every M.
Two types are strategically indistinguishable if they might behave the same. They are strategically equivalent
if nothing they might rationally do could distinguish them. We brie￿ y discuss the alternative, much stronger
notion of strategic equivalence, in section 6.1.
As we noted in the introduction, Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) pioneered the study of the revealed prefer-
ence implications of interdependent preferences. We follow them in characterizing when there are distinct
observational implications of two interdependent preference types, and our characterization, like theirs, is
based on iterated statements about conditional preferences. We do not follow them in constructing a canon-
ical universal type space based on our notion of distinct observational implications, although this would
be an interesting exercise. There are a number of ways in which our frameworks di⁄er: we explicitly
incorporate uncertainty with expected utility preferences about others￿types; and our notion of revealed
(interdependent) preferences is based on rationalizable strategic behavior, while theirs is based on sincere
announcements. Nonetheless, we note in section 6.1 that a property closely related to their validity condition
is su¢ cient to ensure that distinct types are not strategically equivalent.
4.2 Main Result
The main result of this paper is a characterization of strategic indistinguishability.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence)
Types ￿i and ￿
0
i are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they are pairwise inseparable.
This result will be proved in two parts. First, proposition 1 shows that under any ￿nite mechanism, if ￿i
and ￿
0
i are pairwise inseparable, then the intersection of the set of rationalizable messages for ￿i and ￿
0
i will
always be non-empty. This observation follows easily from our de￿nitions.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 13
Proposition 1
If ￿i and ￿
0
i are pairwise inseparable (￿i ￿ ￿
0
i), then SM
i (￿i) \ SM
i
￿
￿
0
i
￿
6= ? in any mechanism M:
Proof. By lemma 3, if ￿i ￿ ￿
0
i, there exists mutually inseparable ￿ with
￿
￿i;￿
0
i
￿
￿ ￿￿
i 2 ￿i.
Now ￿x any mechanism M. We will show, by induction on k, that for each k, i and ￿i 2 ￿i, there exists
mk
i (￿i) 2 Mi such that mk
i (￿i) 2 S
M;k
i
￿
e ￿i
￿
for each e ￿i 2 ￿i. This is true by de￿nition for k = 0. Suppose
that it is true for k. Now ￿x any i and ￿i 2 ￿i. Since ￿ is mutually inseparable, there exists ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i, R
and, for each e ￿i 2 ￿i, ￿
e ￿i
i 2 ￿(￿￿i) such that Re ￿i;￿
e ￿i
i
= R. Now let m
k+1
i (￿i) be any optimal message of
agent i when he believes that his opponents will sent message pro￿le mk
￿i (￿￿i) with probability 1 and has
beliefs ￿
e ￿i
i about the type pro￿le of his opponents, i.e.,
m
k+1
i (￿i) 2 argmax
m0
i
X
￿￿i
￿
e ￿i
i (￿￿i)ui
￿
g
￿
m0
i;mk
￿i (￿￿i)
￿
;
￿
e ￿i;￿￿i
￿￿
.
By construction, m
k+1
i (￿i) 2 S
M;k+1
i
￿
e ￿i
￿
for all e ￿i 2 ￿i.
By the ￿niteness of the mechanism, there exists K such that S
M;k
i
￿
e ￿i
￿
= SM
i
￿
e ￿i
￿
for all i, e ￿i and
k ￿ K. Thus for each ￿i 2 ￿i, there exists mi (￿i) 2 Mi such that mi (￿i) 2 SM
i
￿
e ￿i
￿
for each e ￿i 2 ￿￿
i.
Thus there exists mi 2 SM
i (￿i) \ SM
i
￿
￿
0
i
￿
.
The second part of the theorem￿ s proof is the converse result.
Proposition 2 (Existence of Maximally Revealing Mechanism)
There exists M￿ such that ￿i ￿ ￿
0
i ) SM
￿
i (￿i) \ SM
￿
i
￿
￿
0
i
￿
= ?.
Propositions 1 and 2 immediately imply theorem 1. Proposition 2 is proved by the explicit construction
of a mechanism which will lead every pair of distinguishable types to choose di⁄erent messages. We refer to
the speci￿c mechanism as the ￿maximally revealing mechanism￿ , and spend the rest of this section describing
its construction and ￿nding its properties.
4.3 The Maximally Revealing Mechanism:
We will construct a mechanism that will work for any environment. In the canonical mechanism, each agent
is given K simultaneous opportunities to select a preferred allocation from a given ￿test set￿of allocations.
For each opportunity k to select a preferred allocation, with k = 1;:::;K, the agent is asked to report a
pro￿le of possible choices by the remaining agents in the opportunities preceding the k-th opportunity. If
the report of the agent at opportunity k matches the choices of the other agents in the opportunities below
k, then he will be given the right to choose a preferred allocation. On the other hand, if his report fails to
replicate the choices of the other agents in the opportunities before k, then the designer will simply select the
central lottery ￿ y. While the mechanism is entirely static, it requires each agent to make a series of choices,
each one contingent on the choices of the other agents. In particular, by asking the agent at opportunity
k to match his report with the choices of the other agents at the opportunities before k, we introduce an
inductive structure into the series of choices by each agent. We therefore refer to the k-th opportunity as
the k-th stage or k-th step of the mechanism even though the mechanism itself is entirely static.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 14
The central aspect of the inductive structure of the choice mechanism is that it allows us to analyze the
behavior of the agent in the mechanism in terms of the iterative elimination of dominated strategies. The
precise construction of the choice mechanism is based on two central concepts, the notion of a test set and
the notion of an augmentation of a given mechanism. The test set will give each agent a ￿nite set of choices
and the choice behavior by the agent allows us to distinguish between di⁄erent types of the agent. The
construction of the set of test allocations relies on a few critical implications of our notion of separation. In
turn, the notion of an augmentation permits us to show that we can always construct a more informative
mechanism on the basis of a given mechanism.
4.3.1 Test Allocations
The canonical mechanism will ask each agent to make a series of binary choices between the central lottery ￿ y
and a speci￿c lottery y from the test set. If the test set is to be successful in eliciting the private information
from agent i, then the test set should contain a su¢ cient number of allocations such that for every type ￿i
and every belief ￿i of agent i there exists some allocation y that is strictly preferred to the central lottery ￿ y.
Lemma 4 (Duality)
Type set pro￿le ￿￿i separates ￿i if and only if there exists e y : ￿i ! Y such that
X
￿i2￿i
(e y (￿i) ￿ y) = 0; (6)
and
e y (￿i)P￿i;￿i y; (7)
for all ￿i 2 ￿i and all ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i).
This result says that for each ￿i 2 ￿i, we can identify a direction in lottery space, e y (￿i) ￿ y, that agent
i likes whatever his beliefs about ￿￿i, such that the sum of those changes add up to zero. The proof of the
lemma appears in appendix 8.1. It follows from the following duality result in Samet (1998):
Proposition 3 (Samet (1998))
Let V1;:::;VL be closed, convex, subsets of the N-dimensional simplex ￿N. These sets have an empty inter-
section if and only if there exist z1;::::;zL 2 RN such that
L X
l=1
zl = 0;
and
v ￿ zl > 0, for each l = 1;:::;L and v 2 Vl:
To obtain some intuition for this result, note that it was introduced in Samet (1998) in order to provide a
simple proof of the observation that asymmetrically informed agents will trade against each other if and only
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common prior.9 Suppose that there are N states and L agents. Each agent l observes one of a collection of
signals about the true state. Each signal leads him to have a posterior v 2 ￿N over the states. Let Vl be the
convex hull of his set of possible posteriors. Notice that Vl represents the set of prior beliefs he might have
held over the state space before observing his signal. Thus posterior beliefs are consistent with a common
prior if and only if the intersection of the Vl sets is non-empty. Now consider a multilateral bet specifying
that if state n was realized, agent l will receive payment zln where the total payments sum to zero:
L X
l=1
zln = 0 for all n:
Writing zl = (zln)
N
n=1, we then have
L X
l=1
zl = 0:
There exists such a bet where every agent has a strictly positive expected value from accepting the bet
conditional on every signal if v ￿ zl > 0, for each l = 1;:::;L and v 2 Vl.
We now use lemma 4 to show how, if ￿￿i separates ￿i, we can construct a ￿nite set of lotteries
e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) ￿ Y such that knowing that agent i knows that his opponent￿ s type is in ￿￿i and knowing
his preferences on e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) will always be enough to rule out at least one type in ￿i for agent i.
Lemma 5 If ￿￿i separates ￿i, then there exists a ￿nite set e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) ￿ Y , such that for each ￿i 2 ￿i
and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), there exists y 2 e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) such that
yP￿i;￿iy; (8)
and for some ￿
0
i 2 ￿i,
yP￿0
i;￿0
i y; (9)
for all ￿
0
i 2 ￿(￿￿i).
Proof. By lemma 4, there exists e y : ￿i ! Y such that
X
￿i2￿i
(e y (￿i) ￿ y) = 0;
and
e y (￿i)P￿i;￿iy for all ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i):
Let e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) = fe y (￿i)g￿i2￿i. Fix ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i). Write e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) =
￿
y1;:::;yK￿
, with
y1 = e y (￿i). Let y0 = y and
yl = y + "
l X
￿=1
(y￿ ￿ y);
with " > 0 chosen su¢ ciently small such that yl 2 Y for all l = 1;:::;K. We know y1 P￿i;￿i y0. Suppose
yl+1 R￿i;￿i yl for all l = 1;:::;K ￿ 1. By transitivity, this would imply that:
yK P￿i;￿i y0:
9This converse to the no trade theorem was originally proved by Morris (1994), by a more indirect duality argument.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 16
But yK = y0, so we have a contradiction. We conclude that, for some l = 1;:::;K ￿ 1, yl P￿i;￿i yl+1. This
implies that there exists ￿
0
i such that
y P￿i;￿i y
￿
￿
0
i
￿
.
Since
y
￿
￿
0
i
￿
P￿0
i;￿0
i y for all ￿
0
i 2 ￿(￿￿i),
the inequalities (8) and (9) are established.
Now we will construct a large enough ￿nite set of lotteries (the ￿test set￿ ) such that knowing just an
agent￿ s most preferred outcome on the test set will always reveal enough information about his preferences
to separate out a type, if it is possible to do so.
For any set of lotteries b Y ￿ Y , let B
b Y
i (￿i;￿i) be agent i￿ s most preferred lotteries in the set b Y if he has
payo⁄ type ￿i and (with a minor abuse of notation) let B
b Y
i (￿i;￿￿i) be agent i￿ s possible most preferred
lotteries if he has payo⁄ type ￿i and assigns probability 1 to his opponents having types in ￿￿i, so that
B
b Y
i (￿i;￿i) =
n
y 2 b Y
￿
￿ ￿ y R￿i;￿i y0 for all y0 2 b Y
o
;
and by extension:
B
b Y
i (￿i;￿￿i) =
[
￿i2￿(￿￿i)
B
b Y
i (￿i;￿i):
Proposition 4 (Existence of Finite Test Set)
There exists a ￿nite test set Y ￿ ￿ Y such that:
1. for each i, ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), BY
￿
i (￿i;￿i) 6= Y ￿;
2. for each i, ￿i and ￿￿i, if ￿￿i separates ￿i, then for each ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), there exists
￿
0
i 2 ￿i such that
BY
￿
i (￿i;￿i) \ BY
￿
i
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
= ?.
Our proof is constructive. We ￿rst construct a set e Y consisting of the degenerate lotteries X and the
e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) sets constructed in lemma 5, for every triple (i;￿i;￿￿i) with ￿￿i separating ￿i. Knowing an
agent￿ s ranking of each element of e Y relative to the central lottery y would reveal all the information we
need to extract. In order to extract this information in a single choice, we let the agent pick f : e Y ! f0;1g.
For each y 2 e Y , y is chosen with probability 1=e Y if f (y) = 1, otherwise the central lottery y is chosen. We
let Y ￿ be the set of all such lotteries. Now observing an agent￿ s most preferred outcome in Y ￿ reveals his
binary preference between y and each element of e Y . Since e Y contains each e Yi (￿i;￿￿i), this will ensure part
(2). Since e Y contains degenerate lotteries, the agents will have strict preferences ensuring part (1).Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 17
Proof. Let
e Y = X [
[
f(i;￿i;￿￿i)j￿￿i separates ￿ig
e Yi (￿i;￿￿i).
Now for any f : e Y ! f0;1g, let yf be the lottery obtained by picking an element y 2 e Y with uniform
probability and then choosing lottery y if f (y) = 1 and y if f (y) = 0. Thus we de￿ne:
yf ￿ y +
1
#e Y
X
y2e Y
f (y)(y ￿ y):
Let Y ￿ be the set of such lotteries, i.e.,
Y ￿ =
n
y 2 Y
￿ ￿
￿9f : e Y ! f0;1g such that y = yf
o
.
To prove part (1) of the proposition, ￿x any ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i). By lemma 1, there exists
x 2 X ￿ e Y such that xP￿i;￿iy; now let
f0 (y) = 0, for all y 2 e Y ;
and
f￿ (y) =
(
0, if y 6= x
1, if y = x
So we can write:
yf0 = y; yf￿ = y +
1
#e Y
(x ￿ y)
and so yf0 = 2 BY
￿
i (￿i;￿i).
To prove part (2) of the proposition, suppose that ￿￿i separates ￿i. Fix ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i). By
lemma 5, there exists y 2 e Yi (￿i;￿￿i) and ￿
0
i 2 ￿i such that y P￿i;￿i y and y P￿0
i;￿0
i y for all ￿
0
i 2 ￿(￿￿i).
So
yf 2 BY
￿
i (￿i;￿i) ) f (y) = 0;
while
yf 2 BY
￿
i
￿
￿
0
i;￿i
￿
) f (y) = 1,
and so
BY
￿
i (￿i;￿i) \ BY
￿
i
￿
￿
0
i;￿i
￿
= ?;
which establishes the result.
4.3.2 Uniformly Worse Responses and Augmentation
In this subsection, we report two results that we will use in our analysis. The routine proofs are reported in
Appendix 8.1. First, we note that for any ￿xed ￿nite mechanism M, when we iteratively delete messages
that are not best responses, they are uniformly worse responses, i.e., there exists ￿M > 0 such that each of
those deleted messages is not even an ￿M-best response.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 18
Lemma 6 (Uniformly Worse Responses)
For any mechanism M, there exists ￿M > 0 such that if mi 2 S
M;k
i (￿i), mi = 2 S
M;k+1
i (￿i) and ￿i 2
￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i) satis￿es
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 S
M;k
j (￿j) for each j 6= i
then there exists mi such that
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g￿ (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) >
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g￿ (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) + ￿M.
Second, we use the uniform lower bound in stating a key result about ￿augmenting￿mechanisms. We use
this ￿augmentation lemma￿in the construction of both the maximally revealing mechanism (in this section)
and the canonical mechanism for robust virtual implementation (in the next section). For each player i, ￿x
￿nite message sets M0
i and M1
i and let Mi = M0
i ￿ M1
i . Fix g0 : M0 ! Y , g1 : M1 ! Y and g+ : M ! Y .
Lemma 7 (Augmentation)
Fix ￿0;￿1;￿+ ￿ 0, let g : M ! Y be de￿ned by
g (m) = ￿0g0 ￿
m0￿
+ ￿1g1 ￿
m1￿
+ ￿+g+ (m),
and consider the mechanism
M0 =
￿￿
M0
i
￿I
i=1 ;g0
￿
;
and the augmented mechanism
M =
￿
(Mi)
I
i=1 ;g
￿
.
If ￿+C ￿ ￿0￿M0, then
￿
m0
i;m1
i
￿
2 SM
i (￿i) ) m0
i 2 SM
0
i (￿i).
The lemma states that if the weight put on the original payo⁄ function g0 in the augmented mechanism
(￿0) is much larger than the weight put on any other component of the mechanism where m0 e⁄ects the
allocation (￿+), then any rationalizable message in the augmented mechanism must entail sending a message
m0
i that was rationalizable in the original mechanism.
We are now prepared to provide an explicit construction of the maximally revealing mechanism.
4.3.3 Construction of the Maximally Revealing Mechanism
The maximally revealing mechanism o⁄ers each agent i a series of K opportunities to select a preferred
allocation from the test set Y ￿. The set of messages for each agent in the maximally revealing mechanism
is de￿ned as follows. Let M0
i =
￿
m0
i
￿
and inductively de￿ne
M
k+1
i = Mk
i ￿ Mk
￿i ￿ Y ￿:
Thus M0
i =
￿
m0
i
￿
, M1
i =
￿
m0
i
￿
￿M0
￿i ￿Y ￿, M2
i =
￿
m0
i
￿
￿M0
￿i ￿Y ￿ ￿M1
￿i ￿Y ￿, and so on. The message
m
k+1
i of agent i in stage k + 1 thus reiterates his message from step k and reports a message pro￿le of theStrategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 19
remaining agents in the preceding stage k. Due to the inductive structure of the messages, we can write a
typical element mk
i of Mk
i as a list of the form
mk
i =
￿
m0
i;r1
i;y1
i ;r2
i;y2
i ;:::;rk
i ;yk
i
￿
,
with m0
i = m0
i and each rk
i 2 M
k￿1
￿i and each yk
i 2 Y ￿. The entry rk
i constitutes the report of agent i
regarding the message of the other agents in the previous round k ￿ 1. The message set of agent i is then
given by MK
i .
The outcome function in the revealing mechanism is given by
gK;" (m) = y +
1 ￿ "K
1 ￿ "
1
I
 
K X
k=1
"k￿1
I X
i=1
I
￿
rk
i ;m
k￿1
￿i
￿￿
yk
i ￿ y
￿
!
;
for some " > 0 and where I is the indicator function,
I
￿
rk
i ;m
k￿1
￿i
￿
=
(
1, if rk
i = m
k￿1
￿i
0, otherwise
.
For a given " > 0 and positive integer K, we refer to the (K;") revealing mechanism as
MK;" =
￿
MK;gK;"￿
. (10)
In words, the mechanism has K stages. In each stage k, an agent is asked to announce a stage k￿1 message
pro￿le of messages he thinks his opponents might have sent and - with positive probability - gets to pick a
lottery from Y ￿. Lotteries from early rounds are much more likely to be chosen than lotteries from later
rounds. We can now analyze how the series of messages can iteratively and interactively identify the types
of each agent.
4.3.4 Properties of the Maximally Revealing Mechanism
For small " > 0, an agent￿ s choice of message at the kth round will be independent of what messages he
thinks others will send at round k and higher and thus also independent of K, the total number of rounds
of messages that will be sent. Our strategy for characterizing rationalizable messages is to ￿rst ￿nd the set
￿
1
i
￿
m1
i
￿
of types of player i who could possibly send ￿rst round message m1
i. Since we will ignore later
rounds, this will be independent of " and K. Taking these sets as given, we will then ￿nd the set ￿
2
i
￿
m2
i
￿
of types of player i who could possibly send second round message m2
i. And so on. We will end up with an
inductive characterization of the set ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
of types of player i who could possibly send kth round message
mk
i . We will then appeal to lemma 7 to verify that we can ignore later rounds for su¢ ciently small " > 0.
Finally, we appeal to proposition 4 to verify that - for su¢ ciently small " > 0 and su¢ ciently large K - the
richness of the test set ensures that any pair of mutually separable types are sending distinct messages in
the (K;") revealing mechanism.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 20
Heuristic We initialize
￿
0
i
￿
m0
i
￿
= ￿i;
and inductively de￿ne ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
as follows:
￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
= ￿
k
i
￿￿
m
k￿1
i ;rk
i ;yk
i
￿￿
=
8
> > <
> > :
￿i
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
(i) ￿i 2 ￿
k￿1
i
￿
m
k￿1
i
￿
;
(ii) ￿
k￿1
￿i
￿
rk
i
￿
6= ?; and
(iii) yk
i 2 BY
￿
i
￿
￿i;￿
k￿1
￿i
￿
rk
i
￿￿
.
9
> > =
> > ;
; (11)
The set ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
identi￿es the set of types of agent i for whom the message mk
i =
￿
m
k￿1
i ;rk
i ;yk
i
￿
could be
a ￿best response￿in stage k, given that the messages in the previous rounds encoded a ￿best response￿in
the test set Y ￿. The analysis of the limit behavior of ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
is heuristic in the sense that the inductive
process assumes the properties (ii) and (iii) in (11). In particular, it is simply assumed that agent i in round
k announces a past message pro￿le of the remaining agents which could have been sent by some type pro￿le
of the other agents, and it is simply assumed that agent i will select an allocation which is a best response
to some belief in stage k.
Limit Argument We now show that these choices are indeed the result of iteratively elimination of strictly
dominated strategies. More precisely, we verify that ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
is an upper bound on the set of types who
could send kth round message mk
i in any Mk;" for su¢ ciently small ".
Lemma 8 (Limit)
For each k, there exists " > 0 such that
n
￿i 2 ￿i
￿
￿ ￿mk
i 2 SM
k;"
(￿i)
o
￿ ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
:
for all " ￿ " and mk
i 2 Mk
i .
Proof. By induction. The claim of the lemma holds for k = 0, since
n
￿i 2 ￿i
￿
￿
￿m0
i 2 SM
0;"
(￿i)
o
= ￿i = ￿
0
i
￿
m0
i
￿
.
Now suppose that the claim holds for k. Thus there exists "k > 0, such that
n
￿i 2 ￿i
￿
￿ ￿mk
i 2 SM
k;"
(￿i)
o
￿ ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
for all " ￿ "k and mk
i 2 Mk
i :
Now observe that Mk+1;" is an augmentation of Mk;" and thus - by lemma 7 - there exists "k+1 2 (0;"k],
such that for all " ￿ "k+1,
m
k+1
i =
￿
mk
i ;r
k+1
i ;y
k+1
i
￿
2 SM
k+1;"
(￿i) ) mk
i 2 SM
k;"
(￿i). (12)
Now by the inductive hypothesis, we also have
￿i 2 ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
. (13)Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 21
m
k+1
i = SM
k+1;"
(￿i) also implies there must exist ￿i 2 ￿
￿
￿￿i ￿ M
k+1
￿i
￿
such that (1):
￿i
￿
￿￿i;m
k+1
￿i
￿
> 0 ) m
k+1
j 2 SM
k+1;"
(￿j) for each j 6= i
and (2):
m
k+1
i 2 argmax
m
k+1
i 2M
k+1
i
X
￿￿i;m
k+1
￿i
￿i
￿
￿￿i;m
k+1
￿i
￿￿
ui
￿
gk+1;" ￿
m
k+1
i ;m
k+1
￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿￿
.
But note that
￿
r
k+1
i ;y
k+1
i
￿
- the last components of m
k+1
i - e⁄ect only one additively separable component
of the above expression. In particular,
￿
r
k+1
i ;y
k+1
i
￿
must maximize:
X
￿￿i;m
k+1
￿i
￿i
￿
￿￿i;m
k+1
￿i
￿
I
￿
r
k+1
i ;mk
￿i
￿￿
ui
￿
y
k+1
i ;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
￿ ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i))
￿
(14)
which we can rewrite as
X
￿￿i
X
fm
k+1
￿i jmk
￿i=r
k+1
i g
￿i
￿
￿￿i;m
k+1
￿i
￿￿
ui
￿
y
k+1
i ;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
￿ ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i))
￿
.
The later expression is zero if
￿i
￿
r
k+1
i
￿
￿
X
￿￿i
X
fm
k+1
￿i jmk
￿i=r
k+1
i g
￿i
￿
￿￿i;m
k+1
￿i
￿
= 0.
But if ￿i
￿
r
k+1
i
￿
> 0 and y
k+1
i 2 BY
￿
i (￿i;￿i), where
￿i (￿￿i) =
P
fm
k+1
￿i jmk
￿i=r
k+1
i g
￿i
￿
￿￿i;m
k+1
￿i
￿
X
￿0
￿i
P
fm
k+1
￿i jmk
￿i=r
k+1
i g
￿i
￿
￿
0
￿i;m
k+1
￿i
￿,
then (14) must be strictly positive, by the ￿rst part of proposition 4. Thus we must have
￿
r
k+1
i ;y
k+1
i
￿
chosen
such that ￿i
￿
r
k+1
i
￿
> 0 and y
k+1
i 2 BY
￿
i (￿i;￿i). Now ￿i
￿
r
k+1
i
￿
> 0, (12) and the inductive hypothesis imply
that
￿
k
￿i
￿
r
k+1
i
￿
6= ?; (15)
and
￿i 2 ￿
￿
￿
k
￿i
￿
r
k+1
i
￿￿
and y
k+1
i 2 BY
￿
i (￿i;￿i). (16)
Now (13), (15) and (16) together imply that, for any m
k+1
i 2 SM
k+1;"
(￿i), ￿i 2 ￿
k+1
i
￿
m
k+1
i
￿
.
We next show that the sets ￿
k
i are closely related to kth level inseparable sets ￿k
i , as de￿ned earlier in
(1)-(3).
Lemma 9 For all i and k, ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
2 ￿k
i for all mk
i 2 Mk
i .
Proof. By induction. The claim is true for k = 0 by de￿nition. Suppose ￿
k￿1
￿i
￿
m
k￿1
￿i
￿
2 ￿
k￿1
￿i for all
m
k￿1
￿i 2 M
k￿1
￿i . Now ￿x any mk
i =
￿
m
k￿1
i ;rk
i ;yk
i
￿
2 Mk
i and let ￿i = ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
and let ￿￿i = ￿
k￿1
￿i
￿
rk
i
￿
. By
proposition 4 part (1), every type has some strict preference over Y ￿ and thus will set rk
i equal to some m
k￿1
￿i
he assigns positive probability to. By our inductive assumption, ￿￿i 2 ￿
k￿1
￿i . Now suppose ￿￿i separates
￿i and ￿x ￿i 2 ￿i. By proposition 4 part (2), there exists ￿
0
i 2 ￿i such that yk
i = 2 BY
￿
i
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
. Thus
￿
0
i = 2 ￿
k
i
￿
mk
i
￿
, a contradiction. We conclude that ￿￿i does not separate ￿i.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 22
Conclusion of proof of proposition 2 The proof of proposition 2 can now be completed. For a ￿xed
environment we can choose K such that ￿K = ￿￿. By lemmas 8 and 9, there exists " > 0 such that
n
￿i 2 ￿i
￿
￿ ￿mK
i 2 SM
K;"
(￿i)
o
￿ ￿
K
i
￿
mK
i
￿
2 ￿K
i = ￿￿
i;
for all mK
i 2 MK
i . So
mK
i 2 SM
K;"
(￿i) \ SM
K;" ￿
￿
0
i
￿
)
￿
￿i;￿
0
i
￿
2 ￿￿
i:
Thus the mechanism MK;" satis￿es the property of proposition 2.
5 Robust Virtual Implementation
In this section, we use the notions of strategic distinguishability and the maximally revealing mechanism to
establish necessary and su¢ cient conditions for robust virtual implementation. Virtual implementation of
a social choice function requires a mechanism such that the desired outcomes are realized with probability
arbitrarily close to 1 (see Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) and Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)). Robust
implementation requires implementation of a social choice function depending on agents￿￿payo⁄ types￿
independent of their beliefs and higher order beliefs about others￿payo⁄ types (see Bergemann and Morris
(2005a) and Bergemann and Morris (2005b)). Our de￿nition of robust virtual implementation is the natural
one incorporating both these notions.
5.1 De￿nitions
Write ky ￿ y0k for the Euclidean distance between a pair of lotteries y and y0, i.e.,
ky ￿ y0k =
sX
x2X
(y (x) ￿ y0 (x))
2.
De￿nition 5 (Robust "-Implementation)
The mechanism M robustly "-implements the social choice function f if
m 2 SM (￿) ) kg (m) ￿ f (￿)k ￿ ".
f is robustly "-implementable if there exists a mechanism M that robustly "-implements f.
We can now de￿ne the notion of robust virtual implementation.
De￿nition 6 (Robust Virtual Implementation)
Social choice function f is robustly virtually implementable if, for every " > 0, f is robustly "-implementable.
The relevant incentive compatibility condition required for our robust problem is ex post incentive com-
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De￿nition 7 (EPIC)
Social choice function f satis￿es ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) if, for all i, ￿i, ￿￿i and ￿
0
i:
ui (f (￿i;￿￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ui
￿
f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
.
￿Robust measurability￿requires that if ￿i is strategically indistinguishable from ￿
0
i, then the social choice
function must treat the two types the same. This condition is the robust analogue of the measurability
condition in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c).
De￿nition 8 (Robust Measurability)
Social choice function f satis￿es robust measurability if ￿i ￿ ￿
0
i ) f (￿i;￿￿i) = f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
for all ￿￿i.
5.2 Necessity
It is well known from the literature on virtual Bayesian implementation (e.g., Abreu and Matsushima (1992c))
that the relaxation to virtual implementation does not relax incentive compatibility conditions by a standard
compactness argument.10
Theorem 2 (Necessity)
If f is robustly virtually implementable, then f satis￿es ex post incentive compatibility and robust measura-
bility.
Proof. We ￿rst establish ex post incentive compatibility. Fix any mechanism M that robustly "-
implements f. Fix ￿￿i and m￿i 2 SM
￿i (￿￿i). For any m0
i 2 SM
i
￿
￿
0
i
￿
, virtual implementation requires
￿ ￿g (m0
i;m￿i) ￿ f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ". (17)
Now suppose that player i is type ￿i and is convinced that his opponent is type ￿￿i sending message m￿i.
Let mi be any message which is a best response to that belief. Then mi 2 SM
i (￿i), implying that
kg (mi;m￿i) ￿ f (￿i;￿￿i)k ￿ ". (18)
In particular, by the best response property of mi:
ui (g (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ui (g (m0
i;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)). (19)
Now (17) and lemma 2 imply
￿
￿ui (g (m0
i;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ui
￿
f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿￿ ￿ ￿ "C; (20)
and (18) and lemma 2 imply
jui (g (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ui (f (￿i;￿￿i);(￿i;￿￿i))j ￿ "C: (21)
10Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) and Ledyard (1979) argued in a private value environment that dominant strategy
incentive compatibility was implied by Bayesian incentive compatibility for all priors on a ￿xed type space. In the case of a social
choice function, this argument - generalized to interdependent values - shows the necessity of ex post incentive compatibility
(see Bergemann and Morris (2005c)).Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 24
Now combining (19), (20) and (21), we obtain
ui (f (￿i;￿￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ui
￿
f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
￿ 2"C.
But virtual implementation implies that this holds for all " > 0, so we have
ui (f (￿i;￿￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿ ui
￿
f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
,
and this establishes EPIC as necessary condition.
Next we establish robust measurability. Suppose that f is robustly virtually implementable. Fix any
" > 0. Since f is robustly virtually implementable, there exists a mechanism M" such that
m 2 SM
"
(￿) ) kg (m) ￿ f (￿)k ￿ ".
Now ￿x any ￿￿i and m"
￿i 2 SM
"
￿i (￿￿i). Also ￿x any ￿i ￿ ￿
0
i, so by proposition 1, there exists m"
i 2
SM
"
i (￿i) \ SM
"
i
￿
￿
0
i
￿
. Now
￿ ￿g
￿
m"
i;m"
￿i
￿
￿ f (￿i;￿￿i)
￿ ￿ ￿ " and
￿ ￿g
￿
m"
i;m"
￿i
￿
￿ f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ". Thus
￿
￿f (￿i;￿￿i) ￿ f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿￿
￿ ￿ 2". This is true for each " > 0, so f (￿i;￿￿i) = f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
.
5.3 Su¢ ciency
We ￿rst describe the construction of a canonical mechanism that will be used to establish su¢ ciency. Our
construction follows the logic of Abreu and Matsushima (1992c), which in turn builds on Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992b). In the mechanism we construct, each agent simultaneously announces (i) a message in the
maximally revealing mechanism described above; (ii) L announcements of his payo⁄ type. With probability
close to 1
L, the outcome is chosen according the agents￿lth announcement of their payo⁄ types in part (ii)
of their messages. But with small probability, the outcome is chosen according to the maximally revealing
mechanism and their part (i) messages. The mechanism then checks to see which agents were the ￿￿rst￿to
￿lie￿ , in the sense that his lth report of his type is not consistent with the message he sent in the maximally
revealing mechanism and no other agent sent an inconsistent message in an ￿earlier￿report. If an agent is
not one of the ￿rst to lie, then the agent is rewarded. For this part of the mechanism, we need an economic
property.
De￿nition 9 (Economic Property)
The uniform economic property is satis￿ed if there exist a pro￿le of lotteries, (zi)
I
i=1, such that, for each i
and ￿, ui (zi;￿) > ui (y;￿) and uj (y;￿) ￿ uj (zi;￿) for all j 6= i.
Under the uniform economic property, there will exist a constant c0 such that
ui (zi;￿) > ui (y;￿) + c0 (22)
for all i and ￿.
In the canonical mechanism, part (i) announcements for the maximally revealing mechanism are made as
if the maximally revealing mechanism was being played as a stand alone mechanism (since the probability
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sending a message that ensures that he is not the ￿rst to lie (given his beliefs about others￿strategies) will
always strictly improve on his expected payo⁄, since if others are telling the truth, truth-telling is a weak
best response by ex post incentive compatibility, and if they are lying, for su¢ ciently large L, the reward
will outweigh the cost of not lying in one round of the mechanism.
We write M￿ =
￿
(M￿
i )
I
i=1 ;g￿
￿
for the maximally revealing mechanism. We use three numbers in de￿ning
the canonical mechanism: c0 is the uniform lower bound on an agent￿ s utility gain from having his uniformly
preferred lottery rather than the central lottery; recall from lemma 2 that C is an upper bound on payo⁄
di⁄erences in the environment; recall from lemma 6 whenever a message is deleted in the iterated deletion
process for the maximally revealing mechanism M￿, it is not even an ￿M￿-best response to any conjecture.
We will use these three numbers c0, C and ￿M￿, together with the number of players I, to de￿ne two further
numbers ￿ and L that will be used in the construction of the canonical mechanism. Choose ￿ > 0 such that
￿ <
￿M￿
C
; (23)
and an integer L such that
L >
IC
￿
2c0
. (24)
Now the message space of the canonical mechanism is
Mi = M￿
i ￿
L times
z }| {
￿i ￿ :::: ￿ ￿i = M￿
i ￿ ￿L
i :
Thus a typical message will be written as mi =
￿
m0
i;m1
i;:::;mL
i
￿
, with m0
i 2 M￿
i ; ml
i 2 ￿i for each l = 1;:::;L.
The idea is that an agent is ￿supposed￿to truthfully report his payo⁄ type in each round l = 1;:::;L and
will receive a small punishment if he is one of the ￿￿rst￿to report a type that is not consistent with his 0th
message. The small individual rewards and punishments are provided by
ri (m) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
y, if
9k 2 f1;:::;Lg s.t. m0
i = 2 SM
￿
i
￿
mk
i
￿
;
and m0
j 2 SM
￿
j
￿
ml
j
￿
8j 6= i and l = 1;:::;k ￿ 1;
zi, otherwise.
(In slight abuse of notation, we use ri (m) here to denote rewards whereas we used rk
i earlier in Subsection
4.3.4.) Now the outcome function of the canonical mechanism is:
g (m) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2￿ 1
L
L X
l=1
f
￿
ml￿
+ ￿g￿ ￿
m0￿
+
￿
2
I
I X
i=1
ri (m).
The mechanism g (m) has three components. The ￿rst component, which carries the largest probability,
is the social choice function f itself. The appropriate allocation f
￿
ml￿
will be selected by L replicas, each
one of which is chosen with a small probability 1=L. The second component is the maximally revealing
mechanism outcome function g￿ which receives a smaller weight of ￿. The third and ￿nal component, ri (m),
represents a small reward or punishment. It is designed to give each agent an incentive to replicate in strip
l the report issued in the previous strips. It provides a small ￿punishment￿(y) if player i is the ￿rst toStrategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 26
report in the message component, ml
i, a type inconsistent with previous reports, otherwise ri (m) provides
the small ￿reward￿(zi).
Theorem 3 Under the uniform economic property, if f satis￿es EPIC and robust measurability, then the
canonical mechanism ￿ (1 + ￿) robustly virtually implements f.
This immediately implies the su¢ ciency part of our characterization of robust virtual implementation,
since we can choose ￿ arbitrarily close to 0 in the canonical mechanism.
Corollary 1 (Su¢ ciency) Under the uniform economic property, if f satis￿es EPIC and robust measur-
ability, then f is robustly virtually implementable.
Proof. To prove the theorem, it is enough to establish that, for each i, mi =
￿
m0
i;m1
i;:::;mL
i
￿
2 SM
i (￿i)
implies that (1) m0
i 2 SM
￿
i (￿i) and (2) m0
i 2 SM
￿
i
￿
ml
i
￿
for each l = 1;:::;L. To see why, observe that
m0
i 2 SM
￿
i (￿i) \ SM
￿
i
￿
ml
i
￿
implies ￿i is strategically indistinguishable from ml
i, which implies, by robust
measurability, that f
￿
ml
i;ml
￿i
￿
= f
￿
￿i;ml
￿i
￿
. Since this holds for each i, we have f
￿
ml￿
= f (￿). Since
this is true for each l, we have that the mechanism selects f (￿) with probability at least 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2.
Claim (1) above - that
￿
m0
i;m1
i;:::;mL
i
￿
2 SM
i (￿i) ) m0
i 2 SM
￿
i (￿i) - follows from lemma 7 and inequal-
ity (23), since m0 in￿ uences the outcome only through weight ￿ on g￿ ￿
m0￿
and weight ￿
2 on 1
I
I P
i=1
ri (m).
We will now establish claim (2) above - that
￿
m0
i;m1
i;:::;mL
i
￿
2 SM
i (￿i) ) m0
i 2 SM
￿
i
￿
ml
i
￿
for all i and
l = 1;:::;L.
Suppose this claim were false. Then there must exist i and mi =
￿
m0
i;m1
i;:::;mL
i
￿
2 SM
i (￿i) with
m0
i = 2 SM
￿
i
￿
ml
￿
i
￿
for some l￿ 2 f1;:::;Lg and m0
j 2 SM
￿
j
￿
ml
j
￿
for all j and 1 ￿ l < l￿. Now ￿x any
conjecture ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i) with ￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) mj 2 SM
j (￿j) for all j 6= i. Consider two cases.
First, suppose that
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) m0
j 2 SM
￿
j
￿
ml
j
￿
for all j 6= i and l = 1;:::;L. (25)
In this case, sending the message
mi = (m0
i;
L times
z }| {
￿i;￿i;:::;￿i)
instead of mi will strictly increase i￿ s utility: since he is certain that each agent is reporting a type that is
strategically indistinguishable in each of the L strips, EPIC and robust monotonicity ensure that his utility
will not decrease from truthtelling in the L strips; his utility will be unchanged in the maximally revealing
mechanism; and his utility will be strictly increased in the punishment component. Secondly, suppose that
(25) fails. In this case, we can de￿ne
b l = min
n
l 2 f1;:::;Lg : 9(￿￿i;m￿i) with ￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 and m0
j = 2 SM
￿
j
￿
ml
j
￿
for some j 6= i
o
.
Now sending the message
mi = (m0
i;
b l times
z }| {
￿i;￿i;:::;￿i;m
b l+1
i ;:::;mL
i )Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 27
instead of mi will strictly increase i￿ s utility: since he is certain that each agent is reporting a type that is
strategically indistinguishable in each of the ￿rst b l ￿ 1 strips, EPIC and robust monotonicity ensure that
his utility will not decrease from truthtelling in the ￿rst b l ￿ 1 strips; his utility will be unchanged in the
maximally revealing mechanism; if it turns out that m0
j 2 SM
￿
j
￿
m
b l
j
￿
for some j 6= i, then i￿ s utility will also
not be reduced in the b l￿th strip or in the punishment component; but if it turns out that m0
j = 2 SM
￿
j
￿
m
b l
j
￿
for all j 6= i, then i￿ s utility will be reduced in the b l￿th strip by at most
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2￿ 1
LC and will increase
in the punishment component by at least ￿
2
I c0. The latter exceeds the former by (24).
We conclude that for no conjecture is mi a best response, contradicting our original assumption. This
proves our second claim.
While the basic construction of this proof follows Abreu and Matsushima (1992c), there are some com-
plications that arise in our robust formulation. The messages sent in the maximally revealing mechanism
do not partition an agent￿ s types. Rather, for each set of types that survives the iterated deletion of sets
that can always be separated, there is a message that may be sent by all types in that set. So we say that
message ml
i is consistent with m0
i if message m0
i is one that might be sent by m0
j 2 SM
￿
i
￿
ml
i
￿
.
The economic property can weakened along the lines of assumption 2 in Abreu and Matsushima (1992c).
It would be enough to have that the economic property holds for any type set pro￿le ￿ in the inseparable
type set ￿￿, i.e. for each set pro￿le ￿ = (￿i)
I
i=1 2 ￿￿, there exists (zi)
I
i=1, such that, for each i and
￿ 2 ￿I
i=1￿j; ui (zi;￿) > ui (y;￿) and uj (y;￿) ￿ uj (zi;￿) for all j 6= i.
6 Discussion
6.1 Strategic Equivalence
We brie￿ y discuss the relation between strategic distinguishability and a ￿ner natural relation on payo⁄
types, strategic equivalence.11
De￿nition 10 (Strategic Equivalence)
Types ￿i and ￿
0
i are strategically equivalent if SM
i (￿i) = SM
i
￿
￿
0
i
￿
for every M.
In words, the types ￿i and ￿
0
i are strategically equivalent if the set of rationalizable actions of ￿i and ￿
0
i
agree in every mechanism. In contrast, the types ￿i and ￿
0
i were said to be strategically indistinguishable if
the intersection of their rationalizable actions is nonempty for every mechanism. The following strengthening
of pairwise inseparability is su¢ cient for strategic equivalence. Consider a sequence of pro￿les of partitions
of types of each agent, Pk =
￿
Pk
1;:::;Pk
I
￿
, de￿ned as follows. First, P0
i = f￿ig for all i. Second, writing
Pk
i (￿i) for the unique element of Pk
i containing ￿i, let
P
k+1
i (￿i) =
￿
￿
0
ijRi
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
= Ri (￿i;￿￿i) for each ￿￿i 2 Pk
￿i
￿
for each i, ￿i and k = 0;1;::: .Finally,
P￿
i (￿i) = lim
k!1
Pk
i (￿i).
11We are grateful to Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer for discussions about this connection.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 28
One can easily verify that in the single good example of section 3, P￿
i is the ￿nest partition for any value
of ￿. Thus strategic equivalence is a much more discriminating criterion of distinguishability than pairwise
separability. The requirement that each P￿
i (￿i) is a singleton is essentially the validity property of Gul and
Pesendorfer (2005), translated into our setting. The di⁄erences are that they do not explicitly incorporate
uncertainty, so they have a more general outcome space and their analogue of Ri (￿i;￿￿i) corresponds to
all preferences that you might have given certain beliefs about others￿types; and their analogue has player
i￿ s types equivalent at round k if his conjecture about all agents￿preferences are the same, not just player i.
Now we have the following result:
Proposition 5 If ￿
0
i 2 P￿
i (￿i), then ￿
0
i and ￿i are strategically equivalent.
The proof of proposition 5 is in appendix 8.5. We conjecture that a converse to the proposition is
true: if ￿
0
i and ￿i are strategically equivalent, then ￿
0
i 2 P￿
i (￿i). This could be shown by constructing, for
each ￿
0
i = 2 P￿
i (￿i), a mechanism M with message mi 2 Mi with mi 2 SM
i (￿i) and m0
i = 2 SM
i
￿
￿
0
i
￿
. Such
a construction would rely on constructing mechanism that reveals agents￿beliefs and higher order beliefs
about others types, along the lines of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006).
6.2 Rationalizability and All Equilibria on All Type Spaces
Our analysis took as given the solution concept of incomplete information rationalizability for our environ-
ment. Thus we assumed that if the agents￿true payo⁄ type pro￿le was
￿ = (￿1;:::;￿I),
they might send any message pro￿le
m ￿ (m1;:::;mI) 2
I
￿
i=1
SM
i (￿i) ￿ SM (￿).
Our motivation for employing this solution concept is that we did not want to make any assumption about
agents￿beliefs and higher order beliefs about other agents￿payo⁄ types. In fact, suppose one constructed a
￿type space￿T specifying for each agent a set of possible epistemic types, and, for each epistemic type, a
description of his (known) payo⁄ type and his beliefs about others￿epistemic types. By standard universal
type space arguments, we can incorporate any beliefs and higher order beliefs about others￿payo⁄ types
in such a type space. Now the type space T and a mechanism M together de￿ne a standard incomplete
information game. The set of messages that can be sent by any type of agent i with payo⁄ type ￿i in any
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game (T ;M) for any type space T is equal to SM
i (￿i). This result is the
straightforward incomplete information extension of the classic epistemic foundations result of Brandenburger
and Dekel (1987), showing that the set of actions that can be played in the subjective correlated equilibria
of a complete information game equals the set of actions that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated
actions in that game. Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) reported the incomplete information version of this
result as Propositions 4.2 and 4.3. For completeness, we formally state and prove this result in appendix 8.2.
This observation means that the gap between the solution concepts of pure strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium (Serrano and Vohra (2001), Serrano and Vohra (2005)) and iterated deletion of (interim) strictlyStrategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 29
dominated strategies (Abreu and Matsushima (1992c)) in incomplete information virtual implementation
disappears in our robust approach.12 We consider this to be an attraction of our approach. The intuition
is that the extra bite obtained by the assumption of equilibrium is lost without complementary strong
assumptions on beliefs and higher order beliefs for the implementation problem.
6.3 Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies
Our incomplete information rationalizability solution concept is equivalent to iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies. What would happen if we looked at iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies
instead? In other words, we let W
M;0
i (￿i) = Mi,
W
M;k+1
i (￿i) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
mi 2 W
M;k
i (￿i)
￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
9 ￿i 2 ￿++ (￿￿i ￿ M￿i) s.t.:
(1) ￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) m￿i 2 W
M;k
￿i (￿￿i)
(2) mi 2 argmax
m0
i
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (m0
i;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i))
9
> > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > ;
;
and
WM
i (￿i) =
\
k￿0
W
M;k
i (￿i):
It is easy to see that our ￿negative￿results would go through unchanged. If two types are pairwise inseparable
(￿i ￿ ￿
0
i) then the argument of proposition 1 - unchanged - implies that they will have iteratively weakly
undominated actions in common in every mechanism, or
WM
i (￿i) \ WM
i
￿
￿
0
i
￿
6= ? for all M:
Thus robust measurability is a necessary condition for implementation (virtual or exact) of any social choice
function in iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies in a ￿nite (or compact) mechanism: the argument
of proposition 2 will go through unchanged in this case.
Abreu and Matsushima (1994) show their argument for virtual complete information implementation in
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies can be adapted to show the possibility of exact complete
information implementation in iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies, with some extra restrictions
on the environment. It is a reasonable conjecture that this extension could be adapted to the standard
incomplete information implementation setting of Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) and our robust incomplete
information setting. However, we have not attempted this extension.
Chung and Ely (2001) have shown that in an auction environment with interdependent valuations as
in section 3, the e¢ cient outcome can be implemented in the direct mechanism under iterated deletion of
12Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) showed that their measurability condition was necessary for virtual implementation in mixed
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium restricting attention to well-behaved mechanisms. But it remains an open question whether
the measurability condition is necessary for virtual implementation in pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium restricting
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weakly dominated strategies (i.e., the solution concept described above) under the assumption that ￿ < 1
I￿1.
Our results supply a strong converse: if ￿ ￿ 1
I￿1, it is not possible to implement (exactly or virtually)
any non-trivial social choice function in iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies in any ￿nite (or
compact) mechanism, direct or indirect.13
6.4 Implementation in a Direct Mechanism
We restricted attention in this paper to ￿nite mechanisms. Thus the mechanisms here do not include
any of the pathological features of ￿integer games￿that play an important role in the full implementation
literature and have been much criticized (see, e.g., Jackson (1992)). Nonetheless, the mechanisms in this
paper are complex. The canonical mechanism for robust virtual implementation inherits the complexity of
the mechanism of Abreu and Matsushima (1992c), on which it builds. Our maximally revealing mechanism
generating strategic distinguishability is no simpler. While the mechanisms are theoretically kosher, it has
been argued that their complexity and the logic of the iteration deletion in the mechanism might make them
hard to use in practise. For example, Glazer and Rosenthal (1992) have made this argument about the
mechanism used by Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) for complete information virtual implementation (see
Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) for a response and Sefton and Yavas (1996) for later experiments inspired
by the mechanism).
By requiring robustness to agents￿beliefs and higher order beliefs, we reduce the amount of common
knowledge about the environment that can be used by the planner in designing a mechanism. This will make
it harder to achieve positive results (and our robust measurability condition is rather strong in applications).
But one motivation for studying robust implementation is that we hope that robustness considerations will
endogenously lead to simpler mechanisms when positive results can be achieved. By adapting results from
our earlier work on exact robust implementation in direct mechanisms (Bergemann and Morris (2005a)), we
can report that, in at least one broad class of economic environments of interest, whenever robust virtual
implementation is possible according to corollary 1, it is possible in a direct mechanism where agents simply
report their payo⁄ types.
This result can be nicely illustrated in the environment with interdependent valuations for a single good
of section 3. Recall that if ￿ ￿ 1
I￿1, all pairs of types are pairwise inseparable, so - by this paper￿ s theorem
1 - all pairs of types are strategically indistinguishable, and - by this paper￿ s theorem 2 - robust virtual
implementation of any non-trivial social choice function is impossible in any mechanism. However, it turns
out if ￿ < 1
I￿1, not only does there exist a ￿nite mechanism that robustly virtually implements the e¢ cient
allocation, there is in fact a direct mechanism - where each agent￿ s message space is his set of payo⁄ types -
that does so. To see why, ￿rst observe that there is a well-known simple mechanism that allocates the object
e¢ ciently as a function of agents￿reports of their types. Each agent makes a report bi about his payo⁄ type
￿i. The object is awarded to the highest bidder who must pay the ￿pivotal￿value
max
j6=i
fbjg + ￿
X
j6=i
bj. (26)
13Our results are stated for a lottery space over ￿nite outcomes, but the extension to any compact space and compact
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Truth-telling is ex post incentive compatible in this mechanism; i.e., if you are sure that others will bid truth-
fully, you have an incentive to bid truthfully whatever you think that others will bid. It is straightforward
to modify this direct revelation mechanism to one that virtually allocates the object e¢ ciently with strict
ex post incentive compatibility. With probability 1 ￿ ", allocate the object to the highest bidder; but with
probability ", there is a random allocation rule where one of the agents is chosen with probability 1
I and
he is given the object with probability bi (independently of others￿bids). If bidder i receives the object as
the highest bidder, he must pay the pivotal value (26); if he receives the object under the random allocation
rule, he must pay 1
2bi +￿
X
j6=i
bj. Truth-telling is strictly ex post incentive compatible in this mechanism and
the object is allocated e¢ ciently with probability at least 1 ￿ ". Bergemann and Morris (2005a) establish
that - if ￿ < 1
I￿1 - truth-telling is the unique rationalizable message in this mechanism.14
This observation generalizes to an economically intuitive class of environments. Preferences satisfy ag-
gregator single crossing (ASC) if each agent i￿ s preferences at type pro￿le ￿ belong to a single crossing class
parameterized by hi (￿), where hi : ￿ ! R is a monotonic aggregator. Bergemann and Morris (2005a)
established that exact robust implementation by a compact mechanism is possible if and only if the social
choice function satis￿es strict ex post incentive compatibility and a contraction property on the aggregator
functions h = (h1;:::;hI). In appendix 8.4, we show that under the ASC assumption, robust measurability is
always satis￿ed under the contraction property. If preferences display an easily satis￿ed strict ex post pref-
erences (SEP) condition and a social choice function satis￿es EPIC, then there exists a nearby social choice
function that satis￿es strict EPIC. So under ASC and SEP, if f satis￿es EPIC and robust measurability, f
is robustly virtually implementable in a direct mechanism. Formal statements and proofs of these results
appear in appendix 8.4.
6.5 Exact Implementation and Integer Games
The ￿rst papers on incomplete information implementation focussed on exact implementation. Postlewaite
and Schmeidler (1986) and Jackson (1991) identi￿ed a Bayesian monotonicity condition which (together with
Bayesian incentive compatibility) was necessary and (under weak economic conditions) su¢ cient for exact
implementation in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Bergemann and Morris (2005b) provide a robust analogue of
this result, showing that ex post incentive compatibility and a robust monotonicity condition are necessary
and - under weak economic conditions - su¢ cient for exact robust implementation. All these papers follow a
tradition in the implementation literature of allowing very badly behaved mechanisms, like integer games, in
proving their general results. In this paper, we follow Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) in restricting attention
to ￿nite - and thus well-behaved - mechanisms. We brie￿ y discuss the relation between these results in this
section: a more complete and formal discussion in contained in appendix 8.3.
Robust measurability and robust monotonicity turn out to be equivalent in the important class of ag-
gregator single crossing preferences (see appendix 8.4). However, in general, one can show by example that
14Chung and Ely (2001) earlier noted that the e¢ cient outcome was the only one surviving iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies in the original fully e¢ cient auction without the modi￿cation to generate strict EPIC. We discuss the
relation in section 6.3.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 32
robust measurability neither implies nor is implied by robust monotonicity. Thus requiring only virtual
implementation is sometimes a strict relaxation; and allowing badly-behaved mechanisms is sometimes a
strict relaxation. We do not have a characterization of when exact robust implementation by a well behaved
mechanism is possible (just as analogous characterizations do not exist for complete information and classical
Bayesian implementation). We know only that robust measurability, robust monotonicity and strict ex post
incentive compatibility will all be necessary.
We restrict attention in our analysis to social choice functions rather than social choice correspondences.
Bergemann and Morris (2005c) considered the problem of partially robustly implementing a social choice
correspondence, i.e., ensuring that whatever players￿beliefs and higher order beliefs about others￿types, there
is an equilibrium leading to outcomes contained in the social choice correspondence. In the special case where
the social choice correspondence is a function (and more generally in a class of separable environments), this
is possible only if the function (or a selection from the correspondence in separable environments) is ex post
incentive compatible. But in the general case, we do not have a satisfactory characterization of when partial
robust implementation is possible. For this reason, we have not even attempted a characterization of (full)
robust implementation of social choice correspondences.
7 Conclusion
In an environment with interdependent preferences we introduced a notion of strategic distinguishability by
saying that two payo⁄ types of an agent can be distinguished if they have disjoint rationalizable actions in
some ￿nite game for all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs about others￿types. Conversely, a pair of
payo⁄ types are strategically indistinguishable if in every game, there exists some action which each type
might rationally choose given some beliefs and higher order beliefs. We provided an exact and insightful
characterization of strategic distinguishability.
The notion of strategic distinguishability is related to the idea of incentive compatibility in the context of
information revelation in a mechanism. The di⁄erence between distinguishability and incentive compatibility
arises from the two central features of strategic distinguishability. First, we say that two payo⁄ types
can be strategically distinguished if there exists some mechanism and hence some outcome function for
which the types have disjoint rationalizable actions. In contrast, the analysis of incentive compatibility is
typically concerned with a speci￿c mechanism and hence a speci￿c outcome function. Second, strategic
distinguishability requires that the two payo⁄ types display disjoint rationalizable actions for all possible
beliefs and higher order beliefs. In contrast, the analysis of incentive compatibility is typically concerned
with a ￿xed and common prior belief of the agents.
Despite this distinct perspective suggested by the notion of strategic distinguishability, we then showed
that strategic distinguishability plays an important and natural role in the robust version of virtual imple-
mentation. By virtual implementation of a social choice function f, we require that a given social choice
function is only realized with probability 1￿" for every " > 0. The link between strategic distinguishability
and virtual implementation is established by the remaining " probability. Here we are allowed to select an
arbitrary outcome function, and in particular an outcome function which can identify strategically distin-Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 33
guishable types. Consequently, we show that a social choice function can be virtually implemented for all
possible beliefs and higher order beliefs, i.e. it is robustly virtually implementable if and only if the social
choice function is measurable which respect to strategically distinguishable types.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 34
8 Appendix
8.1 Omitted Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. Suppose that
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) (27)
for all x 2 X. If
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) >
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (x0;(￿i;￿￿i)) (28)
for some x0 2 X, we could conclude, that
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) >
1
N
X
x2X
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) =
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)),
a contradiction. So (27) implies
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) =
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) (29)
for all x 2 X. But (29) implies that R￿i;￿i is indi⁄erent between all pure outcomes and thus all lotteries.
This contradicts assumption 1 on non=degeneracy. We conclude that the non-degeneracy assumption implies
that (27) fails for all i, i.e., that for all i, ￿i 2 ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), there exists x 2 X such that
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) >
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)). (30)
Now suppose that the conclusion of the lemma fails, so that for all " > 0, there exists i, ￿i 2 ￿i and
￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i) such that
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) + "
Thus there exists i and ￿i 2 ￿i such that for each " > 0, there exists ￿
"
i 2 ￿(￿￿i) such that
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿
"
i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿
"
i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) + "
for all x 2 X. The sequence ￿
"
i has a convergent subsequence with limit ￿
￿
i and
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿
￿
i (￿￿i)ui (x;(￿i;￿￿i)) ￿
X
￿￿i2￿￿i
￿
￿
i (￿￿i)ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i))
for all x 2 X. This contradicts (30).
Proof of lemma 4. By de￿nition, type set pro￿le ￿￿i separates ￿i if, for every R 2 R, there exists
￿i 2 ￿i such that R￿i;￿i 6= R for every ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i). Write
X = fx1;x2;:::;xNg; ￿i =
n
￿
1
i;￿
2
i;:::;￿
L
i
o
, and ￿￿i =
n
￿
1
￿i;￿
2
￿i;:::;￿
M
￿i
o
; with M = LI￿1.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 35
The vector
vlm =
￿
ui
￿
xn;
￿
￿
l
i;￿
m
￿i
￿￿￿N
n=1
;
is an element of RN. Without loss of generality (since expected utility preferences can be represented by any
a¢ ne transformation), we can assume that each vlm is an element of the N dimensional simplex ￿N. Now
(vlm)
M
m=1 is a collection of M elements of ￿N, and the set of preferences
n
R￿l
i;￿i : ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i)
o
,
are represented by the convex hull of (vlm)
M
m=1, which we write as
Vl = conv
￿
(vlm)
M
m=1
￿
￿ ￿N:
Thus ￿￿i separates ￿i exactly if
L \
l=1
Vl = ?.
By proposition 3, this is true if and only if there exist z1;::::;zL 2 RN such that
L X
l=1
zl = 0; (31)
and
N X
n=1
vnzln > 0; (32)
for each l and v 2 Vl. But if (zl)
L
l=1 satisfy (31) and (32), we may choose " > 0 su¢ ciently small such that
e y
￿
￿
l
i
￿
= y + "zl 2 Y for each l;
and we have established (6) and (7).
Conversely, if (6) and (7) hold and we set zl = e y
￿
￿
l
i
￿
￿ y for l = 1;:::;L, then (zl)
L
l=1 satisfy (31) and
(32).
Proof of lemma 6. Fix any mi = 2 SM
i (￿i). Then there exists k such that mi 2 S
M;k
i (￿i) and
mi = 2 S
M;k+1
i (￿i). Consider
￿k
i =
n
￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i)
￿
￿ ￿￿i (￿￿i ￿ m￿i) > 0 ) m￿i 2 S
M;k
￿i (￿￿i) for each j 6= i
o
.
For all ￿i 2 ￿k
i , there exists mi such that
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) >
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)).
By compactness of ￿k
i , there exists "i (mi) > 0 such that for all ￿i 2 ￿k
i there exists mi such that
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) >
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (mi;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) + "i (mi).Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 36
Now let
￿M = min
i; ￿i and mi= 2SM
i (￿i)
"i (mi).
Proof of lemma 7. Suppose ￿+C ￿ ￿0￿M0. We will argue, by induction on k, that
￿
m0
i;m1
i
￿
2 S
M;k
i (￿i) ) m0
i 2 S
M
0;k
i (￿i)
for all k ￿ 0. This is true by de￿nition for k = 0; suppose that it is true for k. Now suppose that m0
i = 2
S
M
0;k+1
i (￿i) but
￿
m0
i;m1
i
￿
2 S
M;k+1
i (￿i) and so
￿
m0
i;m1
i
￿
2 S
M;k
i (￿i) and - by the inductive hypothesis -
m0
i 2 S
M
0;k
i (￿i). Now ￿x any ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i) satisfying
￿i
￿
￿￿i;
￿
m0
j;m1
j
￿
j6=i
￿
> 0 )
￿
m0
j;m1
j
￿
j6=i 2 S
M;k
￿i (￿￿i) ) m0
￿i 2 S
M
0;k
￿i (￿￿i).
Let
￿i
￿
￿￿i;m0
￿i
￿
=
X
(m1
j)
j6=i2M1
￿i
￿i
￿
￿￿i;
￿
m0
j;m1
j
￿
j6=i
￿
.
By lemma 6, there exists m0
i such that:
X
￿￿i;m0
￿i
￿i
￿
￿￿i;m0
￿i
￿
ui
￿
g0 ￿
m0
i;m0
￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
￿
X
￿￿i;m0
￿i
￿i
￿
￿￿i;m0
￿i
￿
ui
￿
g0 ￿
m0
i;m0
￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
> ￿M0.
Thus
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui
￿
g
￿￿
m0
i;m1
i
￿
;m￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
￿
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui
￿
g
￿￿
m0
i;m1
i
￿
;m￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
> ￿0￿M0 ￿ ￿+C
￿ 0.
This contradicts our premise that
￿
m0
i;m1
i
￿
2 S
M;k+1
i (￿i). We conclude that
￿
m0
i;m1
i
￿
2 S
M;k+1
i (￿i) )
m0
i 2 S
M
0;k+1
i (￿i):
8.2 Formal Statement and Proof of Epistemic Result
A type space T is de￿ned by T =
￿
Ti;b ￿i;b ￿i
￿I
i=1
, where Ti is a countable set, b ￿i : Ti ! ￿i and b ￿i : Ti !
￿(T￿i).15 A type space T and a mechanism M = (M;g) de￿ne a game where a behavioral strategy for
agent i is a mapping ￿i : Ti ! ￿(Mi) and the interim equilibrium payo⁄ of type ti of agent i if he sends
message mi and other agents follow strategies ￿￿i is
Ui (mi;￿i;ti) ￿
X
t￿i2T￿i
b ￿i (ti)[t￿i]
X
m￿i2M￿i
0
@
Y
j6=i
￿j (tj)[mj]
1
Aui
￿
g (m0
i;m￿i);
￿
b ￿i (ti);b ￿￿i (t￿i)
￿￿
.
15The arguments extend to uncountable type spaces. We focus on countable type spaces for notational convenience.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 37
Strategy pro￿le ￿ = (￿i)
I
i=1 is an interim equilibrium of (T ;M) if
￿i (ti)[mi] > 0 ) mi 2 argmax
m0
i
Ui (m0
i;￿i;ti)
for all i, ti 2 Ti and mi 2 Mi. This is the standard de￿nition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, expressed in
terms of agents interim incentives to choose an optimal action. Without a common prior on the type space,
equilibrium cannot be given an ex ante formulation.
Proposition 6 mi 2 SM
i (￿i) if and only if there exists (i) a type space T =
￿
Ti;b ￿i;b ￿i
￿I
i=1
; (ii) an interim
equilibrium ￿ of (T ;M) and (iii) a type ti 2 Ti with b ￿i (ti) = ￿i and ￿i (ti)[mi] > 0.
Proof. Fix (i) a type space T =
￿
Ti;b ￿i;b ￿i
￿I
i=1
; (ii) an interim equilibrium ￿ of (T ;M) and (iii) a type
t￿
i 2 Ti with (a) b ￿i (t￿
i) = ￿
￿
i; and (b) ￿i (t￿
i)[m￿
i] > 0. Let
S￿
i (￿i) =
n
mi 2 Mij9ti 2 Ti s.t. ￿i (ti)[mi] > 0 and b ￿i (ti) = ￿i
o
:
Now for each i, ￿i in the range of b ￿i and mi 2 S￿
i (￿i), let
￿
￿i;mi
i (￿￿i;m￿i) =
X
ft￿i2T￿i : b ￿￿i(t￿i)=￿￿ig
b ￿i (ti)[t￿i]
X
m￿i2M￿i
0
@
Y
j6=i
￿j (tj)[mj]
1
A. (33)
Now because ￿ is an equilibrium,
mi 2 argmax
m0
i
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿
￿i;mi
i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (m0
i;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)).
Now we show by induction on k that S￿
i (￿i) ￿ S
M;k
i (￿i) for all i;￿i and k. This is true for k = 0 by de￿nition.
Suppose that it is true for k. Now ￿
￿i;mi
i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 implies that m￿i 2 S￿
￿i (￿￿i), by construction, which
implies m￿i 2 S
M;k
￿i (￿￿i) by the inductive hypothesis. Together with (33), this establishes mi 2 S
M;k+1
i (￿i).
This proves the induction. Now m￿
i 2 S￿
i (￿
￿
i) ￿ SM
i (￿
￿
i), proving the ￿if￿claim of the proposition.
Conversely, suppose that m￿
i 2 SM
i (￿
￿
i). Observe that for each i, ￿i and mi 2 SM
i (￿i), there exists
￿
￿i;mi
i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i) such that:
(a) ￿
￿i;mi
i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) m￿i 2 SM
￿i (￿￿i)
(b) mi 2 argmax
m0
i
P
￿￿i;m￿i
￿
￿i;mi
i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (m0
i;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i))
Now construct (i) a type space T with
Ti =
￿
(￿i;mi) 2 ￿i ￿ Mi
￿
￿mi 2 SM
i (￿i)
￿
,
b ￿i ((￿i;mi)) = ￿i, and
b ￿i ((￿i;mi))
h
(￿j;mj)j6=i
i
= ￿
￿i;mi
i (￿￿i;m￿i);
((a) above ensures that this is well-de￿ned) and (ii) a strategy pro￿le ￿ with
￿i ((￿i;mi))[m0
i] =
(
1, if m0
i = mi
0, otherwise
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Now (b) ensures that ￿ is an equilibrium and by construction t￿
i = (￿
￿
i;m￿
i) 2 Ti with b ￿i (t￿
i) = ￿i; and
￿i (t￿
i)[m￿
i] > 0. This establishes the ￿only if￿part of the proposition.
This straightforward incomplete information generalization of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) was ￿rst
stated to our knowledge by Battigalli (1998). A more general version of this result is reported as propositions
4.2 and 4.3 in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003), where they allow for additional restrictions ("￿") on beliefs.
The above result is implied by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) when ￿ is empty.
8.3 Exact Implementation
In this section, we formally put the contribution of this paper in the context of the larger implementation
literature.
The classical complete information literature identi￿ed a monotonicity condition (￿Maskin monotonic-
ity￿ ) on social choice correspondences that is necessary and - under a weak economic condition - su¢ cient
for full implementation in Nash equilibrium. These arguments were generalized to a standard incomplete in-
formation environment by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Jackson (1991) who showed that Bayesian
incentive compatibility and a ￿Bayesian monotonicity￿condition were necessary and - again, under some
weak economic assumption - su¢ cient for full implementation. The su¢ ciency parts of all these results
have been widely criticized for relying on badly behaved mechanisms, i.e., integer games, with pathological
features, i.e., the non-existence of best responses to some conjectures (see, e.g., Jackson (1992)).
In a complete information environment, Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) showed that if
1. the outcome space is a lottery space over ￿nite outcomes and
2. the implementation notion is weakened to require only virtual implementation; but
3. the solution concept is strengthened to require implementation in iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies and
4. mechanisms are restricted to be ￿well-behaved,￿ 16
then essentially all social choice functions could be implemented. Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) generalized
these results to incomplete information, showing that Bayesian incentive compatibility and a measurability
condition (￿AM measurability￿ ) were necessary and su¢ cient for virtual (Bayesian) implementation in it-
erated deletion of (interim) strictly dominated strategies. Notice that (1) is a domain restriction; (2) is a
restriction that makes it easier to obtain a positive result; (3) and (4) are restrictions that make it harder
to obtain a positive result.
A natural question to ask is what happens with di⁄erent combinations of assumptions (2), (3) and
(4). Abreu and Matsushima (1992c) showed that Bayesian incentive compatibility and AM measurability
are necessary conditions for virtual implementation in Bayesian Nash equilibrium in well-behaved mecha-
nisms. Serrano and Vohra (2005) describe a ￿virtual monotonicity￿condition - a weakening of the Bayesian
16Their results are true whether one restricts attention to ￿nite mechanisms or allow more general compact mechanisms where
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monotonicity condition of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Jackson (1991) - which, together with
Bayesian incentive compatibility, is necessary and su¢ cient for virtual implementation in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium using perhaps badly behaved mechanisms. Virtual monotonicity must therefore be a weakening
of AM measurability. Example 2 in Serrano and Vohra (2001) exhibits an environment where all non-constant
social choice functions fail AM measurability fails but all social choice functions satisfy virtual monotonicity
and many satisfy Bayesian monotonicity. On the other hand, the social choice function allocating a single
object e¢ ciently under private values will fail Bayesian monotonicity (any e¢ cient allocation mechanism will
allow undesirable equilibria) but will satisfy AM measurability. Thus Bayesian monotonicity neither implies
nor is implied by AM measurability.
We derived the robust analogue of Jackson (1991) and the exact Bayesian implementation literature in
Bergemann and Morris (2005b). The environment was as in this paper, except that the outcome space Y was
not restricted to be a lottery space. We showed that ex post incentive compatibility and a robust monotonicity
condition were necessary and - under a weak economic condition - su¢ cient for full implementation on all
possible type spaces. As in the classic implementation literature, we did not restrict attention to ￿well-
behaved￿mechanisms. To de￿ne the robust monotonicity condition, let ￿i : ￿i ! 2￿i with ￿i 2 ￿i (￿i); the
interpretation is that ￿i (￿i) describes the set of types that type ￿i might report himself to be. A deception
pro￿le ￿ is given by ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿I). A deception ￿ is acceptable if agents￿reports will always lead to the
right outcome if they are interpreted truthfully, i.e., ￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿i) for each i ) f
￿
￿
0￿
= f (￿). Now:
De￿nition 11 (Robust Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satis￿es robust monotonicity if for every unacceptable deception ￿, there exist i, ￿i,
￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿i) such that, for all ￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i, there exists y such that
ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) > ui
￿
f
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
(34)
for all ￿￿i such that ￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i (￿￿i); and
ui
￿
f
￿
￿
00
i ;￿
0
￿i
￿
;
￿
￿
00
i ;￿
0
￿i
￿￿
￿ ui
￿
y;
￿
￿
00
i ;￿
0
￿i
￿￿
(35)
for all ￿
00
i 2 ￿i.
Under the other necessary condition of ex post incentive compatibility, this condition - like the robust
measurability condition of this paper - has the interpretation that it requires that there be not too much
interdependence in preferences. To see why, consider the extreme case of private values, when we remove
the dependence of utility on others￿types. In this case, ex post incentive compatibility becomes dominant
strategies incentive compatibility,
ui (f (￿i;￿￿i);￿i) ￿ ui
￿
f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
;￿i
￿
for all i, ￿i, ￿
0
i and ￿￿i; and robust monotonicity reduces to the requirement that for every unacceptable
deception ￿, there exist i, ￿i, ￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿i) such that
ui
￿
f
￿
￿i;￿
0
￿i
￿
;￿i
￿
> ui
￿
f
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿
;￿i
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for all ￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i. The latter requirement is simply a requirement that ex post incentive constraints be strict
often enough. The robust monotonicity requirement adds little to incentive compatibility conditions under
private values. As values become more interdependent, the set of rewards y that can be o⁄ered in de￿nition
11 are reduced, and the condition becomes stronger.
In section 8.4, we show that in a large class of economic signi￿cant environments, robust monotonicity
and robust measurability have an identical ￿not too much interdependence￿ characterization. However,
in the remainder of this section we document that robust measurability neither implies nor is implied by
robust monotonicity. This observation parallels our summary observation above about the standard Bayesian
implementation literature: AM measurability neither implies nor is implied by Bayesian monotonicity.
8.3.1 Example 1: Robust Measurability holds while Robust Monotonicity fails
Consider an environment with two agents, a and b. The payo⁄ type space of each agent i is given by
￿i =
￿
￿
1
i;￿
2
i;￿
3
i
￿
. The allocation space is given by X = fx1;x2;x3;x4g. Below we display the payo⁄ of
agent a. The payo⁄s for agent b are symmetric.
x1 ￿
1
b ￿
2
b ￿
3
b
￿
1
a 1 1 1
￿
2
a 1 1 0
￿
3
a 0 0 1
x2 ￿
1
b ￿
2
b ￿
3
b
￿
1
a 0 0 1
￿
2
a 1 1 1
￿
3
a 1 1 0
x3 ￿
1
b ￿
2
b ￿
3
b
￿
1
a 1 1 0
￿
2
a 0 0 1
￿
3
a 1 1 1
x4 ￿
1
b ￿
2
b ￿
3
b
￿
1
a
2
3 + " 2
3 ￿ " 2
3
￿
2
a
2
3 + " 2
3 ￿ " 2
3
￿
3
a
2
3 + " 2
3 ￿ " 2
3
(36)
With the payo⁄ matrix given by (36), it is easy to characterize pairwise separability. Observe that ￿j
separates ￿i whenever #￿i ￿ #￿j and #￿i > 1 but not if #￿i < #￿j or #￿i = 1. Thus while the 0th
level inseparable sets of agent i, ￿0
i, will consist of all sets of types, the 1st level inseparable sets of agent
i, ￿1
i, will consist of all sets of types with cardinality at most 2, and the 2nd level inseparable sets of agent
i, ￿2
i, will consist exactly of all singletons. Thus all pairs of distinct types are pairwise separable and thus
strategically distinguishable, and so any social choice function will satisfy robust measurability.
We will show that robust monotonicity fails for some f. In fact, we will show that a weaker property
implied by robust monotonicity in the context of lotteries fails:
De￿nition 12 (Directional Robust Monotonicity)
Social choice function f satis￿es directional robust monotonicity if for every unacceptable deception ￿, there
exist i, ￿i, ￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿i) such that, for all ￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i, there exists y such that
ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) > ui (y;(￿i;￿￿i)) (37)
for all ￿￿i such that ￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i (￿￿i); and
ui
￿
y;
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿￿
￿ ui
￿
y;
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿￿
. (38)
Consider the deception with ￿i (￿i) = ￿i for all i and ￿i. By symmetry of the payo⁄s and the deceptions
across states, it su¢ ces to consider a single type pro￿le ￿i = ￿
1
a and ￿
0
i = ￿
2
a and likewise ￿
0
￿i = ￿
2
b. WeStrategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 41
require that there exists y such that - by (37) -
ua
￿
y;
￿
￿
1
a;￿
1
b
￿￿
> ua
￿
y;
￿
￿
1
a;￿
1
b
￿￿
;
ua
￿
y;
￿
￿
1
a;￿
2
b
￿￿
> ua
￿
y;
￿
￿
1
a;￿
2
b
￿￿
; (39)
ua
￿
y;
￿
￿
1
a;￿
3
b
￿￿
> ua
￿
y;
￿
￿
1
a;￿
3
b
￿￿
;
and
ua
￿
y;
￿
￿
2
a;￿
2
b
￿￿
￿ ua
￿
y;
￿
￿
2
a;￿
2
b
￿￿
. (40)
We rewrite the inequalities (39)-(40) explicitly in terms of payo⁄s and probabilities with y = (y1;y2;y3;y4) =
(y1;y2;y3;1 ￿ y1 ￿ y2 ￿ y3) and ￿ y =
￿1
4; 1
4; 1
4; 1
4
￿
.
y1 + y3 +
￿
2
3
+ "
￿
(1 ￿ y1 ￿ y2 ￿ y3) >
1
4
+
1
4
+
1
4
￿
2
3
+ "
￿
;
y1 + y3 +
￿
2
3
￿ "
￿
(1 ￿ y1 ￿ y2 ￿ y3) >
1
4
+
1
4
+
1
4
￿
2
3
￿ "
￿
;
y1 + y2 +
￿
2
3
￿
(1 ￿ y1 ￿ y2 ￿ y3) >
1
4
+
1
4
+
1
4
2
3
; (41)
and
1
4
+
1
4
+
1
4
￿
2
3
￿ "
￿
￿ y1 + y2 +
￿
2
3
￿ "
￿
(1 ￿ y1 ￿ y2 ￿ y3): (42)
But now we have a contradiction to the condition of directional robust monotonicity as (41) and (42) jointly
cannot be satis￿ed.
8.3.2 Example 2: Robust Measurability fails but Robust Monotonicity holds
There are two agents 1 and 2 and each agent i has two types, ￿i and ￿
0
i. There are six pure outcomes,
X = fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5;x6g. The state dependent utility of agents 1 and 2 are depicted in the following
tables:
x1 ￿2 ￿
0
2
￿1 1;1 1;1
￿
0
1 1;1 1;1
x2 ￿2 ￿
0
2
￿1 0;0 0;0
￿
0
1 0;0 0;0
x3 ￿2 ￿
0
2
￿1 2;2 ￿2;0
￿
0
1 0;0 0;2
x4 ￿2 ￿
0
2
￿1 ￿2;0 2;2
￿
0
1 0;2 0;0
x5 ￿2 ￿
0
2
￿1 0;0 0;2
￿
0
1 2;2 ￿2;0
x6 ￿2 ￿
0
2
￿1 0;2 0;0
￿
0
1 ￿2;0 2;2
Suppose agent 1 assigns equal probability to each type of agent 2. Then - whatever his type - his expected
utility from allocations (x1;x2;x3;x4;x5;x6) are (1;0;0;0;0;0). Thus
￿
￿2;￿
0
2
￿
does not separate
￿
￿1;￿
0
1
￿
. A
symmetric argument establishes that
￿
￿1;￿
0
1
￿
does not separate
￿
￿2;￿
0
2
￿
. We conclude that no pair of types
of each agent are pairwise separable and only constant social choice functions satisfy robust measurability.
But consider the following (Pareto-e¢ cient) social choice function:
f ￿2 ￿
0
2
￿1 x3 x4
￿
0
1 x5 x6Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 42
Strict ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity both hold. To verify the latter, observe
that consider any deception with ￿1
￿
e ￿1
￿
= ￿1 for some e ￿1. Without loss of generality, assume that
￿1 (￿1) = ￿1. Type ￿1 reporting ￿
0
1 can be o⁄ered outcome a to report the deception. Now consider any
deception with ￿1
￿
e ￿1
￿
=
n
e ￿1
o
for each e ￿1 and ￿2
￿
e ￿2
￿
= ￿2 for some e ￿2. Without loss of generality,
assume that ￿2 (￿2) = ￿2. Type ￿2 reporting ￿
0
2 receiving report ￿
0
1 can be o⁄ered outcome f
￿
￿
0
1;￿2
￿
to
report the deception.
Results in Bergemann and Morris (2005b) show that robust implementation by a perhaps badly behaved
mechanism must be possible. We can illustrate this result with the following mechanism. Agent 1 sends a
message m1 2 M1 =
￿
￿1;￿
0
1
￿
[ f1;2;3;::::g, agent 2 sends a message m2 2 M2 =
￿
￿2;￿
0
2
￿
. If m1 2
￿
￿1;￿
0
1
￿
,
then g (m1;m2) = f (m1;m2); if m1 2 f1;2;3;::::g, then g (m1;m2) is the lottery putting probability 1
m1 on
x2 and probability 1￿ 1
m1 on x1. Now truth-telling survives iterated deletion of never best responses. Also,
(i) sending message 2 (expected payo⁄: 1
2) is always a better response for agent 1 than mis-reporting his
type (payo⁄: 0) and (ii) choosing m1 + 1 (expected payo⁄: m1
m1+1) is always a better response for agent 1
than sending message m1 (payo⁄: m1￿1
m1 ). So player 1 must tell the truth. Truth-telling is then the only best
response for agent 2.
8.4 Aggregator Single Crossing Preferences
In this subsection, we consider the implications of the results in this paper for a class of economic environ-
ments introduced in Bergemann and Morris (2005a).
The main structural assumption in this subsection is the existence of a monotonic aggregator hi (￿) for
each i which aggregates the types of the agents. The aggregator hi (￿) serves as a su¢ cient statistic of the
entire type pro￿le ￿ = (￿1;:::;￿I) in determination of the preference of agent i.
De￿nition 13 (Aggregator Single Crossing Preferences)
Preferences are Aggregator Single Crossing (ASC) if, for each i, there exists hi : ￿ ! R and vi : Y ￿R ! R
such that
1. hi is strictly increasing in ￿i and increasing in ￿￿i;
2. vi (y;z) is continuous, an expected utility functional on Y , for each z 2 R, and strict single crossing,
i.e.,
vi (y;z0) = vi (y0;z0) ) sign(vi (y;z) ￿ vi (y0;z)) = ￿sign(vi (y;z00) ￿ vi (y0;z00))
for all z > z0 > z00;
3. for any ￿i and ￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i), there exists z 2 [hi (￿i;minsupp(￿i));hi (￿i;maxsupp(￿i))] such that
v (￿;z) represents R￿i;￿i.
We maintain this assumption on preferences throughout this section. Bergemann and Morris (2005a)
introduced this class of preferences in a strictly more general environment than that in this paper: Y was an
arbitrary compact space, each ￿i was a compact space, each hi was continuous in ￿, each hi (￿i;￿) did notStrategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 43
need to be increasing in ￿￿i and vi was a continuous function (not necessarily an expected utility functional).
Bergemann and Morris (2005a) showed that the following contraction property was equivalent to the robust
monotonicity of all social choice functions. We write ￿
￿ for the ￿truth-telling￿deception, i.e., ￿
￿
i (￿i) = f￿ig
for each i and ￿i.
De￿nition 14 (Contraction Property)
The aggregator functions h satisfy the contraction property if, for all ￿ 6= ￿
￿, there exists i and ￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿i)
with ￿
0
i 6= ￿i, such that
sign
￿
￿i ￿ ￿
0
i
￿
= sign
￿
hi (￿i;￿￿i) ￿ hi
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿￿
for all ￿￿i and ￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i (￿￿i).
So results in Bergemann and Morris (2005b) - described in section 8.3 - show that ex post incentive com-
patibility and the contraction property are necessary and - under a weak economic condition - su¢ cient for
robust implementation in some (perhaps badly behaved) mechanism. Bergemann and Morris (2005a) con-
sider well behaved (i.e. compact) mechanisms. Consider the following strict ex post incentive compatibility
condition:
De￿nition 15 (Strict EPIC)
Social choice function f satis￿es strict EPIC if for all i, ￿i and ￿￿i:
ui (f (￿i;￿￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)) > ui
￿
f
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
;(￿i;￿￿i)
￿
;
if f
￿
￿i;￿
0
￿i
￿
6= f
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿
for some ￿
0
￿i.
Bergemann and Morris (2005a) show that strict EPIC is necessary for robust implementation by a
compact mechanism. Moreover, they show that strict EPIC and the contraction property are su¢ cient for
robust implementation in the direct mechanism. With this background, we show what our results in this
paper imply about ASC preferences.
We recall that ￿￿ is the limit of the kth level inseparable sets de￿ned in (1) - (3). We say that there is
full separation if each ￿￿
i is the collection of singletons and thus every distinct pair of types of every agent
is pairwise separable. We will show that the contraction property is equivalent to full separation.
Proposition 7 The contraction property implies full separation.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. We suppose that the contraction property holds and full separation
fails. By lemma 3, there exists mutually inseparable ￿, and for some agent i there is a set ￿i 2 ￿i which is
not a singleton. We now use this collection of sets ￿ to construct a deception as follows:
￿i (￿i) =
￿
￿
0
i
￿
￿￿i;￿
0
i 2 ￿i for some ￿i 2 ￿i
￿
.
By construction, we have ￿ 6= ￿
￿. By the hypothesis of the contraction property, there exists i, ￿i and ￿
0
i 2
￿i (￿i) such that for all ￿￿i and all ￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i (￿￿i), we have
sign
￿
￿i ￿ ￿
0
i
￿
= sign
￿
hi (￿i;￿￿i) ￿ hi
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿￿
. (43)Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 44
By construction, we have ￿i;￿
0
i 2 ￿i 2 ￿i. Now consider any ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i. By construction of the deception
￿, we have
￿￿i = ￿￿i (￿￿i) =
￿
￿
0
￿i : ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i
￿
￿
0
￿i
￿￿
for some ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i. We will show that ￿￿i separates ￿i. Suppose without loss of generality that ￿i > ￿
0
i.
Then it follows from (43) that for all ￿￿i;￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i, we have hi (￿i;￿￿i) > hi
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿
. In particular,
min
￿￿i2￿￿i
hi (￿i;￿￿i) > max
￿0
￿i2￿￿i
hi
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿
,
but that means that we can ￿nd a pair of allocations (y;y0) such that we have a preference reversal for all
types ￿￿i;￿
0
￿i. Thus
Ri (￿i;￿￿i) \ Ri
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿
= ?:
But now we have established that ￿￿i separates ￿i for all ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i. This contradicts our assumption that
￿ was mutually separable.
Say that ￿ is a symmetric deception if ￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿) ) ￿i 2 ￿i
￿
￿
0
i
￿
. To prove the converse result, we will
exploit the following alternative characterization of the contraction property.
Lemma 10 The contraction property holds if, for all symmetric ￿ 6= ￿
￿, there exists i and ￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿i) with
￿
0
i 6= ￿i, such that
sign
￿
￿i ￿ ￿
0
i
￿
= sign
￿
hi (￿i;￿￿i) ￿ hi
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿￿
for all ￿￿i and ￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i (￿￿i).
Proposition 8 Full separation implies the contraction property.
Proof. Suppose full separation holds. Consider any ￿ 6= ￿
￿ and let
￿i =
￿
￿
0
i
￿
￿￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿i) and ￿
0
i ￿ ￿i for some ￿i 2 ￿i
￿
[
￿
￿
0
i
￿
￿￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿i) and ￿
0
i ￿ ￿i for some ￿i 2 ￿i
￿
.
(44)
By full separation and lemma 3, there exists i and ￿i such that ￿￿i separates ￿i for all ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i.
By the construction of ￿, there exists ￿
￿
i such that either ￿i =
￿
￿
0
i
￿
￿￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿
￿
i) and ￿
0
i ￿ ￿
￿
i
￿
or ￿i =
￿
￿
0
i
￿ ￿￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿
￿
i) and ￿
0
i ￿ ￿
￿
i
￿
. Suppose without loss of generality that ￿i =
￿
￿
0
i
￿ ￿￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿
￿
i) and ￿
0
i ￿ ￿
￿
i
￿
.
Fix any ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i. Since ￿￿i separates ￿i, we have that
\
￿i2￿i
Ri (￿i;￿￿i) = ?.
By the monotonicity of hi, this implies that
hi
￿
￿
0
i;max￿￿i
￿
< hi (￿i;min￿￿i).
By symmetry of ￿ and construction of ￿￿i, there exists ￿￿i 2 ￿￿i such that
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and
￿
0
￿i = max￿￿i 2 ￿￿i (￿￿i):
So we have i, ￿i and ￿
0
i 2 ￿i (￿i) such that
sign
￿
￿i ￿ ￿
0
i
￿
= sign
￿
hi (￿i;￿￿i) ￿ hi
￿
￿
0
i;￿
0
￿i
￿￿
for all ￿￿i and ￿
0
￿i 2 ￿￿i (￿￿i). By lemma 10, we have established the contraction property.
Taken together, propositions 7 and 8 establish that - with ASC preferences - full separation is equivalent
to the contraction property. Thus, for a social choice function that is everywhere sensitive to the state,
robust measurability, robust monotonicity and the contraction property are all equivalent.
We now have that in the environment of this subsection, the results of this paper imply that robust
virtual implementation is possible by some ￿nite mechanism if and only if the contraction property holds
and the social choice function satis￿es ex post incentive compatibility. Bergemann and Morris (2005a) show
that robust exact implementation is possible in the direct mechanism if and only if the contraction property
holds and the social choice function satis￿es strict ex post incentive compatibility.
Intuitively, it is easy to turn weak incentive constraints into strict incentive constraints if one can relax
exact to virtual implementation. The following is an easy su¢ cient condition for doing this.
De￿nition 16 (Strict Ex Post Preferences)
Preferences are strict ex post (SEP) if there exists a social choice function satisfying strict EPIC.
Corollary 2 If preferences are strict ex post and the social choice function satis￿es EPIC and the contraction
property, then the social choice function is robustly virtually implementable in the direct mechanism.
Proof. If preferences are strict ex post, there exists a social choice function g which is strict EPIC. Now ￿x
any social choice function f which satis￿es EPIC and consider the social choice function f" = "g+(1 ￿ ")f;
f" satis￿es strict EPIC. So, since the contraction property is satis￿ed, f" is (exactly) robustly implementable
in the direct mechanism, by the main result in Bergemann and Morris (2005a). Thus f is robustly virtually
implementable in the direct mechanism.
8.5 Strategic Equivalence
Proof of proposition 5. Fix any mechanism M. We will show, by induction on k, that for each k,
￿
0
i 2 Pk
i (￿i) ) S
M;k
i
￿
￿
0
i
￿
= S
M;k
i (￿i). This is true by de￿nition for k = 0. Suppose that it is true for
k. Now ￿x any i, ￿
0
i 2 P
k+1
i (￿i) and mi 2 S
M;k+1
i (￿i). The latter property implies that there exists
￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ M￿i) such that
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) m￿i 2 S
M;k
￿i (￿￿i) (45)
and
mi 2 argmax
m0
i
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui (g (m0
i;m￿i);(￿i;￿￿i)). (46)Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 46
Let
￿i (￿i) =
X
m￿i2M￿i
￿i (￿￿i;m￿i).
Now ￿
0
i 2 P
k+1
i (￿i) implies that, for each ￿￿i 2 Pk
￿i, there exists ￿i;￿￿i;￿
0
i;￿￿i 2 ￿(￿￿i) such that
R￿0
i;￿0
i = R￿i;￿i. Thus there exist ￿i;￿
0
i 2 ￿
￿
Pk
￿i
￿
such that
X
￿￿i2Pk
￿i;￿￿i2￿￿i;
￿
0
i (￿￿i)￿
0
i;￿￿i (￿￿i)ui
￿
￿;
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿￿
is an a¢ ne transformation of
X
￿￿i2Pk
￿i;￿￿i2￿￿i;
￿i (￿￿i)￿i;￿￿i (￿￿i)ui (￿;(￿i;￿￿i)).
Now if we let
￿0
i (￿￿i;m￿i) =
8
> > <
> > :
￿
0
i (￿￿i)￿
0
i;￿￿i (￿￿i)
￿i(￿￿i;m￿i) X
￿0
￿i
￿0
i(￿￿i;m￿i)
, if
X
￿0
￿i
￿0
i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0
0, otherwise
,
(45) implies
￿0
i (￿￿i;m￿i) > 0 ) m￿i 2 S
M;k
￿i (￿￿i);
and (46) and the above a¢ ne equivalence imply that
mi 2 argmax
m0
i
X
￿￿i;m￿i
￿0
i (￿￿i;m￿i)ui
￿
g (m0
i;m￿i);
￿
￿
0
i;￿￿i
￿￿
.
Thus mi 2 S
M;k+1
i (￿i) .
8.6 Relaxing the Non-Degeneracy Assumption
We maintained assumption 1 on non-degeneracy throughout the paper. Our results can be extended to allow
degenerate preferences. Write R to be the degenerate preference relation of complete indi⁄erence over all
lotteries. Consider the following modi￿ed de￿nition of kth level inseparable sets allowing the possibility of
degenerate preferences:
￿0
i = 2￿i
￿
k+1
i =
8
> > <
> > :
￿i 2 ￿k
i
￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿
9￿￿i 2 ￿k
￿i and R 2 R
￿￿
R
￿
such that for all ￿i 2 ￿i
either (1) R 2 Ri
￿
￿i;￿0
￿i
￿
for some ￿0
￿i 2 ￿k
￿i
or (2) R 2 Ri (￿i;￿￿i)
9
> > =
> > ;
; (47)
￿￿￿
i = \k￿1￿k
i
Thus ￿i survives at the (k + 1)th round only if there is ￿￿i 2 ￿k
￿i and R 2 R
￿￿
R
￿
such that, for each
type of ￿i, observing his preferences cannot rule out the possibility that he thinks ￿￿i is the set of possibleStrategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 47
type pro￿les of his opponents and has preferences R. There are two ways this could happen. First, he may
think some other set ￿0
￿i 2 ￿k
￿i is the set of possible type pro￿les of his opponents, but he is completely
indi⁄erent. Or he might actually think ￿￿i is the set of possible type pro￿les of his opponents and have
preferences R.
Now say that two types ￿i and ￿
0
i are pairwise inseparable* if
￿
￿i;￿
0
i
￿
2 ￿￿￿
i . Now theorem 1 can be
generalized - allowing degeneracy - to show that types ￿i and ￿
0
i are strategically indistinguishable if and
only if there pairwise inseparable*.
Allowing the possibility of degenerate preferences in our robust virtual implementation analysis is not very
interesting. Suppose that degeneracy remains in the limit of the kth level inseparable sets described above
in (47); in other words, suppose that there exists a type ￿i such that R 2 Ri
￿
￿i;￿0
￿i
￿
for some ￿0
￿i 2 ￿￿
￿i.
Then ￿i will be contained in any set that survives the procedure for agent i, i.e., ￿i 2 ￿￿￿
i ) ￿i 2 ￿i. Thus
we will have ￿i is pairwise inseparable* from ￿
0
i for every ￿
0
i 2 ￿i. Thus robust virtual implementation will
require that the social choice function be independent of agent i￿ s type.Strategic Distinguishability May 31, 2007 48
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